HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF COMPLEX NORMATIVE

SYSTEMS

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
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
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For Eric, without whose constant support and patience this would not have been possible.

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ABSTRACT

This research explores the tension between the stability and flexibility of complex

normative systems by mapping the interaction among established and emerging normative

practices, and discursive justifications thereof. First, by critically engaging with Finnemore and

Sikkink's norm life cycle model, I construct an alternative ideal-type of complex normative

systems evolution. Second, I overlay the aforementioned ideal-type onto a historical narrative

regarding the evolution of humanitarian intervention practices in the context of US foreign

policy in the 1990s. Through the comparison of the ideal-type and historical narrative, I arrive at

adequate, coincidental, and incidental analytical causal factors related to the evolution of

complex normative systems. I find that the evolutionary process for normative systems is a

function of the how actors frame and discursively justify their own practices and how external

events, which alter actors' imaginations of what constitutes appropriate practice, causing actors

to critically reflect on those practices and justifications.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Some of the most iconic symbols of ancient civilizations—the pyramids at Giza, the Great Wall of China, the Athenian Acropolis, etc.—were built on the backs of slaves. Slavery is justified in ancient religious texts and was defended as "natural" by generations of philosophers including the likes of Aristotle.[1] Indeed, ancient, medieval, and even early modern empires and nations explicitly engaged in a vast slave trade. During the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, a transatlantic slave trade thrived. Apart from dissenters who, for a long period of history, constituted a minority, many upheld slavery as a property right. Slavery was an accepted and defended reality of political and economic life. Within the span of one hundred years, however, perceptions regarding the morality of slavery rapidly changed. The transatlantic slave trade was abolished in the early 1800s. The British Empire banned slavery among its own territories with the Slave Trade Act of 1807. France was declared a non-slave state after the 1814 Treaty of Paris that ended the Napoleonic Wars. By the end of the U.S. civil war, commercial slavery was abolished among nearly all Western states.[2] More importantly, few continued to defend slavery as "natural." Although slavery persists today in different forms—domestic servitude, child labor, etc.—slavery is considered a gross violation of human rights and personal liberty. Those who traffic humans for slavery are among the most reviled criminals and in many jurisdictions are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. This dramatic shift in normative practice—that is, patterns of behaviors considered appropriate by actors—demands attention.

This sort of fundamental change regarding a subset of international political relations is

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[1] Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery," *Political Theory* 15, no. 3 (August 1987): 390-410.

[2] See Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848*, London: Verso, 1988.

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not isolated. Contemporary conceptualizations of non-intervention based on notions of sovereignty based on the centrism of "Westphalian" nation-states were gradually constructed in the centuries after the 1648 Peace at Westphalia.[3] This sweeping international change is commonly recognized, even among scholars who argue that the state is the most (some would even say, the only) appropriate unit of analysis in international relations. Prior to the seventeenth century, power was (de)centralized in a number of ways. City-states, loose confederations, empires and vassals, territories marked by an absence of central government, religious rule, and other political arrangements pixelated the global political landscape. John Ruggie explains that pre-modern and early modern feudal European states consisted of chains of lord-vassal relationships and that these networks blurred the lines of what constituted internal versus external politics.[4] Daniel Nexon also adds that complex structures of clientalism and patronage blurred political borders, disallowing the existence of discrete sovereign states. Instead, composite states were endemic to early modern Europe—that is, "heterogeneous political communities… confederative or imperial, ruled by heredity or elected princes, or operating as autonomous republics, most early modern European states were composed of numerous subordinate political communities linked to central authorities through distinctive contracts specifying rights and obligations."[5]

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[3] Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. Nexon warns that Peace at Westphalia did not produce the same sort of sovereignty we recognize today: "While some early modern European polities—both before and immediately after the Peace of Westphalia—had many of the attributes of modern states, they did not combine these attributes in ways that justify identifying them as inexorably "on their way" to becoming modern states" (18).

[4] John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35, no. 2: 261-285.

[5] Nexon, 2009: 6.

For centuries, the present conceptualization of "Westphalian sovereignty" itself only directly applied to the political landscape of Europe. Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney also provide a recovered narrative of overlapping sovereignty during pre-colonial India's Mughal Empire, whereby land ownership was conceptualized as separate from the land's products; thus, sovereign ownership of land was divided between (1) local peoples and political associations, who had the right to keep the land and harvest from it), and (2) the imperial government, who had a sovereign right to collect revenues from the lands products.[6] Only much later was a version of sovereignty more closely aligned with how it is currently understood exported through colonialism and imported through nationalist movements in colonies and sub-state regions—and even during this process it changed in form and practice.[7] Whereas before it was acceptable that great powers intervene in territories not organized as states, the proliferation of sovereign statehood made intervention increasingly inappropriate as an international practice—even condemnable as a violation of a right to self-determination. The practice of sovereignty has varied across time and space, and has changed as different societies traded with one another, engaged in diplomacy or warfare with one another, or conquered one another.

Regarding warfare, what is considered the appropriate conduct of hostilities has also shifted dramatically. Partially on account of technological breakthroughs, the wars of the present are more precise more regulated than the wars of the past. Armies no longer line up across from one another. More recently, a world revolted by the total warfare of World War I and World War

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[6] Naeem Inayatullah, and David L. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference*, New York: Routledge, 2004.

[7] Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. Hall identifies three different shifts in European sovereign arrangements: (1) dynastic-sovereign; (2) territorial-sovereign; and (3) national-sovereign.

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II placed constraints on what it considered appropriate conduct during armed conflict. It is no longer acceptable for combatants to target non-combatants. It is no longer acceptable for militaries to use certain weapons that the international community deems too odious. It is no longer acceptable to perpetrate genocide against one's own population. Although occasional deviations take place, since the entry into force of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, for example, chemical weapons have only been used in armed conflict a handful of times (indeed, it is not terribly difficult to imagine an alternative world where chemical weapons would have marked every armed conflict had the Protocol not been enforced and policed). Similarly, states largely no longer hire pirates[8] or mercenaries[9] to aid in the conduct of armed hostilities. Professional, nationalized military forces have become the overwhelmingly preferred practice, and deviators can face harsh penalties.

Martha Finnemore discusses the extinction of the global practice of forcible collection of state debts.[10] In trying to answer why this practice has ended, Finnemore paints a picture of a complex international system marked by layers of actors (i.e. states, international organizations, and non-state actors) and structures (i.e. principles such as that of sovereign equality, bureaucracies, and identity/value systems). These layers interact with one another to produce

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[8] Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996; Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," *International Organization* 44, no. 4 (1990): 479-526.

[9] Thomson, 1996; Sarah V. Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; Sarah V. Percy, "Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law," *International Organization* 61, no. 2 (2007): 367-397.

[10] Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003: 24-51.

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outcomes that are far from inevitable. Although Finnemore then goes on to articulate that her findings are meant to be "[offered] as hypotheses for future testing,"[11] something which is certainly not the concern or purpose of this research, her narrative of normative shift is instructive. Indeed, it highlights the complexity that underlies the ways in which international practices evolve.

At an even more fundamental level, participation in political life has itself undergone clearly visible change. Whereas three hundred years ago many countries, empires, and city-states prevented racial and religious minorities, as well as women, from engaging in national politics, this rule is rapidly reversing. Within the last fifty years, the degree of representation of women in national politics across most of the world has significantly increased[12]—albeit, there is plenty of room for more improvement. The gradual replacement of religious and racial litmus tests with a professional civil service has translated into real gains for minority groups who are now less restricted with respect to serving as government civil servants. The generally increasingly progressive standards for the inclusion of minorities and women—indeed, of diversity more broadly—in government positions are partially the result of the salience of higher standards of human rights, discouragement of political corruption, focus on the rule of law, and emphasis on democratic representation.[13]

Of course, although many practices and rules that govern behaviors have changed in global politics, some common themes have remained in place. Some contend that anarchy at the

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[11] Ibid.: 23.

[12] For an account of women's participation in politics, see *Women in Parliaments, 1945-1995: A World Statistical Survey*, Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1995.

[13] See J. Ann Tickner, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001: 104-105.

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international level has persisted.[14] Others argue the nature of anarchy has altered given states' changeable interests in mitigating visible anarchy's deleterious effects through the creation of international organizations and institutions.[15] Invisible hierarchies have also persisted. Feminist scholarship points to gendered hierarchies as impacting international political life. Differences of class, race, religion, and other socially constructed groupings are also often organized hierarchically, implicitly ordering international interactions among individuals who identify according to those groups, or who are perceived to be members of those groups. Similarly, although formalized colonial structures have been largely eliminated during the decolonization process in the 1950s and 1960s, activists decry neocolonialism in the form of cultural imperialism and economic hegemony. Even rules that have undergone revision have often changed gradually—indeed, in some instances, glacially. For example, the transition away from Westphalian notions of absolute state sovereignty towards the Responsibility to Protect's (R2P) principle of "sovereignty as responsibility"[16] is not only uncertain, but is being contested slowly, among successes and setbacks in implementing its logical ends.[17]

It remains unclear, despite an abundance of research on normative evolution, which conditions cause existing ideas of what constitutes appropriate conduct to yield to the pressures

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[14] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.

[15] Robert O. Keohane, and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security* 20 no. 1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.

[16] Gareth Evans, et al., *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.

[17] Annika Bjorkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 15, no. 1 (2002): 9-23.

of change (or the converse: which conditions cause emerging or suggested ideas to die out and have little long-term impact on existing, albeit contested, ideas regarding appropriate practices). When do international actors begin to see the value of different sets of practices and behaviors? What changes their individual and collective minds? In short, how do normative practices evolve?

Literature

Beginning to answer this question—how do normative practices evolve?—is the purpose of this research. Before I begin to lay the foundations for examining this question, I will discuss what other authors mean when they talk about international (1) norms and (2) normative practices. Audie Klotz defines norms as "shared (thus social) understandings of standards for behavior."[18] Stephen Krasner adds to this: "Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations."[19] Similarly, Finnemore and Sikkink define norms as "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity."[20] Robert Axelrod links norms and cooperation: that in cases where norms are hierarchical, cooperation is coercively attained, and that in cases where norms are equitable cooperation is freely offered.[21] Friedrich Kratochwil,

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[18] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995: 14.

[19] Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," In Stephen D. Krasner (Ed.), *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983: 2.

[20] Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn, 1998): 891; Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: 18.

[21] Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986): 1109.

although characterizing the characteristics of what constitutes normative behavior quite differently than Axelrod, Finnemore and Sikkink, Klotz, and Krasner, maintains that "all norms are problem-solving devices for dealing with the recurrent issues of social life: conflict and cooperation"[22] According to these definitions (1) norms are socially created; (2) these authors—except Kratochwil—treat norms as discrete *objects* that act upon other objects in the international system; and (3) norms constitute some sort of standard of proper conduct.

Norms are, by definition, stable constructs that have relatively clear and fixed boundaries (in that scholars who research norms can limit their discussion to a particular set of substantive claims as internal to a norm, and other sets of claims are external).[23] For instance, Martha Finnemore's research on norms regarding the use of force for collecting sovereign debt defines that that behavior is norm-generated, and simultaneously articulates the existence of other substantively discrete norms: i.e. sovereign equality, self-determination, and acting through institutionalized legal mechanisms.[24] Talking about "norms as things" alludes to their rigid boundaries—that something distinguishes the internal qualities of the norm from the external world. In agreeing with Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True that constructivist scholarship ought to analyze normative processes rather than "norms as things," I intentionally reject the terminology (and the substantive baggage) of "norms" so as to avoid reproducing the idea that it is useful to describe norms as things and to reduce confusion as I compare my own ideal-typical

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[22] Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Condition of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989: 69.

[23] Mona Lena Krook, and Jacqui True, "Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 1 (2012): 107.

[24] Finnemore, 2003: 49-51.

account of normative change to scholarship that employs the "norms as things" approach.

Instead of analyzing norms per se, I look at what I call "complex normative systems." When I write about *norms*, I am referring to other scholars' work; when I talk about *complex normative systems*, I am describing my own ideal-typical account of normative change, rooted in literature on "normative practices." Rather than bundles or packages of multiple norms, complex normative systems are layers norm-governed practices as well as the representational discourses that justify those practices. It may be more useful to think of complex normative systems as bundles of practices, actors' internal logics justifying why they conceptualize those practices to be appropriate, and the external discourses actors produce to justify their practices to others. Justificatory language is not sufficient to constitute the normativity of practices because nearly any practice can be justified; justification does not make something normative. Indeed, even horrible crimes and atrocities have been defended by their perpetrators as justified in any number of ways, but they remain deviations from normative practice, rather than constituting normative practices themselves.

Therefore, what makes normative systems *normative—and complex—*is that the logics actors use to reach the conclusion that the practices in question are justifiable are rooted in multi-layered regimes of "rightness" and regimes of "truth"[25]—that is, they are layered in an intricate web of other related practices and justificatory discourses. A more precise definition of complex normative systems will be presented in chapter 3. For now, it is enough to distinguish between

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[25] See Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1980: 131. "Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth, the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true." To the last sentence I would add: "*and right*."

norms and complex normative systems, and to note that most mainstream Constructivist literature in International Relations focuses on the former.

Since the "norms as things" paradigm is most commonly cited in IR literature, I will briefly provide an overview of what analytical power literature provides for understanding how norms and normative practices evolve. Robert Axelrod's work regarding norm evolution modeling is an appropriate place to start as it catalyzed the inclusion of norms in academic debates among a number of social science disciplines. Axelrod's norm evolution model assumes the existence of two or more rational, self-interested actors who interact in a system without direct oversight from a superseding power.[26] This mirrors the anarchical international structure conceived by Realist international relations scholars. Within this structure, Axelrod describes an evolutionary model of norm emergence and decay that is largely rooted in a classical game theoretical prisoner's dilemma—that is, actors can choose whether to punish those who deviate from expected behaviors (which in this case are expected on account of particular normative frameworks).[27]

The evolutionary model of norm creation draws on the analogy between norms and genes. Axelrod states that a behavior that "works well for [an actor] is more likely to be used again while [a behavior that] turns out poorly is more likely to be discarded."[28] Norms emerge, according to Axelrod, from centers of power and reputation. Axelrod further elaborates several factors that help determine how norms remain stable including: (1) the existence of *metanorms*— behavioral expectations related to how to enforce particular norms and how to treat adherents

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[26] Axelrod, 1986: 1109.

[27] Ibid.: 1097.

[28] Ibid.

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and deviators thereof; (2) power asymmetry among actors whereby one or a small group of actors can exercise dominance over others; (3) internalization of norms; (4) deterrence through punishment; (5) actors' judgments of "correct behavior" as determined by that behaviors frequency within actors' general conduct; (6) in-group membership conformity; (7) adherence to laws that incentivize certain behaviors and prohibit others; and (8) preservation a positive reputation for norm adherents all the while fostering negative reputations for deviators.[29]

Axelrod argues that social norms are kept intact to a great degree by the willingness of certain actors to "punish cheaters whenever they are detected"[30] In fact, the punishment of norm deviators is integral to Axelrod's definition of what constitutes a norm: "A norm exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way."[31] For Axelrod punishment of those who deviate from norms is not sufficient because of the high cost to the punisher[32] (applied to international relations for instance, we see that it would be expensive for the United States to punish Syria via use of military force for alleged chemical weapons use).[33] As a result, Axelrod suggests that norms are stronger where punishers adhere to a metanorm of taking retributive measures against other actors who are neither norm violators nor bear the cost of punishment. In international relations, this is difficult particularly because of the existence of norms of non-aggression and

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[29] Ibid.: 1102-1108.

[30] Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," *The American Political Science Review* 100, no. 4 (Thematic Issue on the Evolution of Political Science in Recognition of the Centennial of the Review, November 2006): 682.

[31] Axelrod, 1986: 1097.

[32] Axelrod, 2006: 683.

[33] Spencer Kimball, "Top US General Warns of Syria Intervention Costs," *Deutsche Welle*, August 23, 2013.

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non-intervention based on notions of state sovereignty. For a punisher actor at the international level to engage in retributive measures against "neutral" states would constitute a serious violation of international legal norms regarding just war and would require the punisher actor to envision the particular norm that it is defending as so integral to its national interest as to supersede its other constraints.

Putting aside Axelrod's more controversial point—that a norm punisher would be better served by engaging in retributive action against non-punishers—the notion that norms require a punisher can be seen in two ways. First, Constructivist scholars would argue that the power basis of a norm is not merely material but also ideological. Second, and more damaging to the idea that norms are relevant in the conduct (or study) of international relations, Realists and regime theorists would argue that material power forms the foundation of international norms to the degree that norms are a direct result and inseparable from regional or global hegemons—thus, Realists argue norms are epiphenomenal. As such, the hegemonic power of a particular state or group of states is what creates a particular set of norms, which those states project onto the rest of the world because they believe the behavior prescribed by those norms to be in their own interest. Coercive power maintains such a group of states' position at the top of the global hierarchy and it also provides them with the ability to maintain normative hegemony (a Constructivist or a Realist flirting with Constructivism would add: *which in turn helps those in power legitimate their power and actions*).[34] Mearsheimer's critique of the relevance of international organizations can also be applied to this view of norms: "institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative power; as a result,

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[34] Klotz, 1995: 21-25.

institutional outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power."[35]

Ethan Nadelmann's account of the evolution of prohibitive norms leads him to argue that actors' "moral interests and emotional dispositions" complement power dynamics, which are reflected in the norm emergence process.[36] The integration of faith, conscience, and emotion as valid interests expands the assumed mind-set of actors otherwise characterized as "self help"-driven and absorbed by the motivation of maximizing material gains. Nadelmann explains that this integration occurs for prohibition regimes because often the behaviors actors seek to ban are framed as evil.[37] This point highlights the importance of discourse and rhetoric on actors' perceptions regarding appropriate behavioral patterns.

Ann Florini also proposes that norms emerge according to an evolutionary model. According to Florini's model, norms instruct behaviors, norms are inherited through the transmission of culture and identity. It is unclear whether Florini's concept of normative inheritance refers to inter-actor norm proliferation as per what I later describe as Finnemore and Sikkink's concept of cascading, or to the temporal continuity of certain normative status quos. Both are intuitively possible interpretations. Norms are contested and therefore are constantly subject to the process of natural selection[38]—that is, as per Axelrod's argument, behaviors more effective at achieving a particular goal are rewarded and thus thrive, whereas less effective ones are discarded.[39] For Florini, the first condition that determines whether a norm emerges from its

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[35] John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 82.

[36] Nadelmann, 1990: 524-526.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (1993): 363-389.

[39] Axelrod, 1986: 1109.

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abstract state is its initial prominence—how likely a new norm is to get foothold among international actors and that such foothold can be catalyzed "either because someone is actively promoting the norm, or because the state where the mutant norm first arose happens to be particularly conspicuous."[40] With this statement, Florini seconds Axelrod's point that stronger states have an advantage in proposing and enforcing new behaviors. The second condition that influences the possible success of a new norm is the coherence with which it is defined and articulated.[41] The emergence of R2P via the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) is, for instance, partially an attempt by the supporters of the new norm of intervention based on the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility" to more clearly articulate the central behaviors and expectations associated with that norm. The third factor affecting norm evolution is the degree to which the environment in which the norm is presented is substantively and procedurally favorable.[42] This suggests that proposed norms that are more similar to the status quo are more likely to succeed in altering the general normative landscape.

The degree of similarity of proposed norms to status quo norms is called *adjacency*. The concept of adjacency is expanded on slightly by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in their abstract discussion of a norm life cycle[43] (to which I will refer later), and is also alluded to in other works. Darren Hawkins, for instance, characterizes the development of transnational networks of advocates for international human rights norms responding to human rights

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[40] Florini, 1993: 374, 387.

[41] Jeffery W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism," *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (1997): 31-61.

[42] Florini, 1993: 369.

[43] Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 887-917.

violations in Chile in 1980s as (at least partially) dependent on the prior existence of strong

"ideals of democracy and human rights… in Chilean history."[44] Thus, the norm of advocating for

international human rights was possible because of a preexisting norm for domestic human rights

norms advocacy. Richard Price calls the process of reframing behaviors so that they shift their

congruency with one framework of norms to another *grafting*. He provides the example that

NGO actors linked the normative use of anti-personnel mines by states to norms *in bello* to make

distinction between combatants and non-combatants, rather than to norms of state prerogative to

select its weapons of choice to enhance national security.[45]

     Complementing the evolutionary model of norm evolution (which focuses on macro-level

competition among various norms), Finnemore and Sikkink's life cycle model is norm-specific,

consisting of three phases. First, during the initial process of *norm emergence* norm

entrepreneurs are essential actors who try and persuade others to embrace new norms. These

norm entrepreneurs use their own individual and collective human agency to take advantage of

"chance occurrences, and favorable events."[46] Finnemore and Sikkink, like Florini, maintain that

norms do not emerge in a vacuum, and instead norm entrepreneurs build norms with "strong

notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community" in mind.[47] Norm

entrepreneurs can be states, individuals, or often "non-state groups and… transnational and trans-

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[44] Darren Hawkins, "Human Rights Norms and Networks in Authoritarian Chile," In Sanjeev
    Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink (Eds.), *Restructuring World Politics:*
    Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, Minneapolis: University of
    Minnesota Press, 2002: 50.

[45] Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,"
    International Organization 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998): 613–644.

[46] Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 896.

[47] Ibid.

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governmental coalitions."[48] The second phase of the norm life cycle is *norm cascading*. Norm cascades only occur after norm entrepreneurs have generated sufficient support for a particular norm. When a critical mass of support is reached, norms "tip" and then enter a cascade, whereby the actions of norm entrepreneurs and the desire for conformity and legitimation among actors proliferate particular norms horizontally across actors, who imitate, adopt, and carry out the newly normalized behavior(s). This horizontal proliferation of norms is then joined by increased vertical consolidation of normative behaviors through the third phase of the norm life cycle: *norm internalization*. Successful norms become so widely accepted that they are no longer subjects of debate and become assumed as the status quo.[49] More importantly, internalized norms comprise the often-subconscious lenses through which international actors define and come to understand their interests—indeed, even themselves and their relationship to others.[50] Florini calls internalized norms "units of instruction."[51] Because the norm life cycle is an ideal-typified account of norm evolution and is thus intentionally abstracted from empirical realities, it is empirically difficult to classify particular behavioral patterns along the norm life cycle.

   Equally interesting as the norm life cycle model itself is Finnemore and Sikkink's discussion of the three factors that contribute to the success and failure of particular norms in becoming influential.[52] The first factor has to do with the conditions during which norm

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[48] Hurrell, 2007: 75; Klotz, 1995: 21-25.

[49] Ibid.: 904-905.

[50] Peter J. Katzenstein (Ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

[51] Florini, 1993: 387.

[52] Ibid.: 905-909. Finnemore and Sikkink muddy the philosophical ontological waters by stating that the factors that might lead to norms' degree of influence—which fit within their

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entreprenuer suggest new norms. If an actor seeks to increase its own legitimacy—Finnemore and Sikkink provide the example of a regime seeking to increase its legitimacy vis-à-vis its constituents—that actor might ascribe to certain norms more readily so to gain favor with other actors who presumably favor those certain norms.[53] Andrew Hurrell extends and applies actors' desire for legitimacy to international organizations by stating, "Even on purely pragmatic grounds, states need to justify their actions in terms of… norms and to seek the legitimacy from those international bodies that are the repositories and developers of those norms."[54] The second factor draws on Florini's aforementioned concept of norm prominence. The third factor relates to the internal qualities of a norm or, more specifically, to (1) a norm's similarity to the normative context in which it arises (adjacency), and (2) changes to the international environment that foster desires among actors to become norm entrepreneurs so to advance new norms that correct a status quo wrong. In the former instance, norms that are more similar to the existing international context are more likely to emerge victorious, whereas in the latter instance norms that might deviate from status quo ante might be more likely to find footing.

It is also important to note that the status quo ante international system consists of norms that are not directly related to particular norms in question. For instance, if one were to analyze the evolution of norms of against slavery, the normative context in which such anti-slavery norms evolve includes a plethora of other norms that range from deeply interconnected with (i.e. broader norms related to fair treatment of prisoners of war) to profoundly dissociated from (i.e. norms related to environmental regulation of industrial output) norms of slavery. Norms that are

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ideal-typified account of norm evolution—are "hypotheses that could be tested… in future research."

[53] Ibid.: 906.

[54] Hurrell, 2007: 9.

closer related to one another can be "mutually reinforcing… [and] appear to strengthen each other."[55] The impact of shifts in one norm might impact the evolution of other seemingly unrelated norms in unpredictable and hidden ways. Thus, we should remember the complexity of overlapping international normative structures and heed Finnemore's observation when we engage in norm research: "Norms do not just evolve; they coevolve."[56]

Judith Kelley, while employing Finnemore and Sikkink's ideal-typified norm life cycle model in her analysis of election monitoring norms, focuses on developing a new method for analyzing the causal complexity driving norm evolution. In order to "systematically examine the many subparts of the extensive argument about the emergence, timing, cascade, and internalization of international election monitoring," Kelley breaks up the process of norm evolution into "observable implications," against which she compares empirical data.[57] Kelley concludes that "a focus on the normative environment and institutionalization may, for example, be able to explain quite well why and how monitoring emerged… A focus on this normative environment alone, however, would not explain the timing or pace of the spread."[58]

Are we any closer to explaining how normative practices evolve? The aforementioned authors discuss ideal-typified notions of norm evolution and they provide a number of potentially

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[55] Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," In Peter J. Katzenstein (Ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 161; Barry Hart Dubner, "Human Rights and Environmental Disaster: Two Problems that Defy the Norms of the International Law of Sea Piracy," *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce* 23 no. 1 (1997).

[56] Finnemore, 2003: 71.

[57] Judith Kelley, "Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring," *International Organization* 62, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 232.

[58] Ibid.: 250.

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useful explanations for why some norms are successfully integrated into the patchwork of cumulative international behavioral patterns. The specifics of why particular norms emerge remain imprecise. Mona Krook and Jacqui True also remark that Finnemore and Sikkink's life cycle model of norm evolution is not sufficiently dynamic to account for internal changes to norms *after* they have emerged.[59] Likewise, causal factors explaining norms' horizontal diffusion across and vertical internalization within actors, although more prominent in the literature, lack specificity. I will briefly discuss a few of the explanations articulated in the literature.

Some scholars have used *socialization* to explain norm evolution.[60] G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan analyze how socialization leads to international norms becoming constraints on domestic behavior.[61] They conclude that the timing of socialization is an important determinant as to whether a particular new norm will have lasting impact, that the socialization of international norms onto domestic actors happens among elites rather than among broad segments of the population, and that socialization through persuasion is often supplemented by socialization through coercion.[62] The uptake of new norms according to this view seems to require exogenous pressure—that is, actors must *be socialized*, or acted upon. Timur Kuran contradicts this by analyzing actors' voluntary adherence to evolving norms. According to his account, certain norms diffuse across actors and are internalized within actors through "reputational cascades"—self-reinforcing processes that lead actors to seek to enhance their own

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[59] Krook and True, 2012.

[60] Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," *International Organization* 47, no. 4 (1993): 565-597.

[61] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 283-315.

[62] Ibid.; 313-314; Renee de Nevers, "Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement," *International Studies Review* 9, no. 1 (2007): 53-80.

reputations.[63]

Ikenberry's and Kupchan's discussions of socialization timing are consequential for norm evolution by problematizing Florini's argument that norms that are more similar to the existing international context are more likely to emerge triumphant, whereas in the latter instance norms that might deviate from status quo ante might be more likely to find footing. When the issue of timing is introduced, one sees that under specific circumstances—such as periods of great international crisis—there may be a temporal window of opportunity during which existing norms become pariahs and norm entrepreneurs, unhappy with the realities produced by those status quo behavioral patterns, may seek to dramatically alter certain norms. As a result, similarity between proposed and existing norms may actually become an impediment to the adoption of the former over the latter. The literature on norm evolution fails, in my view, to adequately describe the temporal *size* of *windows of opportunity* for norm evolution in cases where international contexts demand that emerging norms possess different degrees of similarity relative to existing normative frameworks.

Other authors, such as Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, focus on how norms affect actors rather than on norm evolution processes.[64] Such study of domestic adoption of international norms is particularly visible in Klotz's discussion of international norms surrounding South Africa's institutionalized racial apartheid. One must remember that some of the countries that

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[63] Timur Kuran, "Ethnic Norms and the Transformation through Reputational Cascades," *Journal of Legal Studies* XXVII (June 1998): 623-659.

[64] Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, "Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement Issues," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, no. 4 (1992): 634-664. Goertz and Diehl contest Axelrod's definitional assumption that adherence to norms can be attributed to the rationality of actors: "norms provide an important kind of motivation for action that irreducible to rationality or indeed to any other form of optimizing mechanism" (662-663, quoting Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989: 15.).

eventually implemented progressive, anti-apartheid policies vis-à-vis South Africa also had histories of racial segregation and slavery.[65] How did those countries transition from being perpetrators of racial violence and human rights abuses to becoming the defenders of (at least the concept, if not the practice of) human rights? This question suggests that the study of psychological, sociological, and intra-state political processes that allowed for sub-state norms to evolve might also guide future research on international norm evolution.[66] These questions, of course, imply that the subject of research is the inverse of the question posited by this research—how do normative practices evolve. Scholarship focusing on the *effects* of norms largely treats the (co/re)production of norms by actors as *a priori*.

Wayne Sandholtz takes a more systemic approach to explaining norm change through an ideal-typified norm evolution model.[67] Sandholtz argues that the systems of international norms contain inherent contradictions and tensions. These tensions create conceptual spaces in which new normative ideas can be nurtured and developed. Furthermore, the desire to reconcile contradictions and eliminate tensions allows particular norms to advance and others to stagnate. Norms that are better suited to fill systemic gaps, resolve systemic tensions, and eliminate systemic contradictions are more likely to emerge than alternatives that are less successful in achieving these functions. Although this model presents a vastly different account of norm evolution, it largely ignores actors' individual or group interests. It would be worthwhile for researchers to consider the possibility that some norms shift over time despite having relative

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[65] Klotz, 1995.

[66] Amitav Archaya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," *International Organization*, 58 (2004): 242; see Legro, 1997.

[67] Wayne Sandholtz, "Dynamics of International Norms Change," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2008): 101-131.

strong associated metanorms and operating with a backdrop of strong complementary (rather than contradictory) norms. Are there instances where new norms fail to resolve tensions in the pre-existing international normative system? Might these new norms at times actually contribute to problematizing the system in which they emerge?

Some authors who discuss norm development stray away from emergence and focus instead on norm *adoption*. Giulia Andrighetto, et al., describe a difference between social conformers and norm recognizers. The former converge on new normative behavior homogenously, in a single action, and imitate their neighbors' actions. Norm recognizers, however, converge over a longer period of time while preserving their behavioral autonomy, thus enhancing the stability of the adopted norms.[68] Complementing this research, Finnemore argues that international organizations can also act as "teachers" to gradually change what states see as their interests—thus catalyzing states' "recognition" of social norms, rather than their mere conforming to those norms, to use Andrighetto's language. In particular, some international organizations may be viewed by states as technical rather than political bodies (i.e. the International Telecommunication Union providing guidance for regarding telecommunications technical standards, and the International Monetary Fund's for economic sector reforms), adding gravitas to their behavioral recommendations, as states may view those recommendations as driven by efficiency goals instead of political ones.[69] There are also several mechanisms with which international organizations can socialize norms among individual members; these

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[68] Giulia Andrighetto, Marco Campennì, Federico Cecconi, and Rosaria Conte, "The Complex Loop of Norm Emergence: A Simulation Model," *Simulating Interacting Agents and Social Phenomena* (2010): 33.

[69] Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Poltiics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.

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mechanisms, which can have tangible effects, include suasion, mimicking, communication,[70] and shaming.[71]

<div align="center">Chapter Outline</div>

My review of the literature on normative evolution exposes significant challenges for IR scholars who research complex social processes. First, ideal-typified models of norm evolution, including Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle model and Florini's evolutionary model are deeply contested by authors who tease out from empirical accounts' additional complexity. Second, while norm scholars have spent considerable time and effort researching norm evolution, normative practice scholars have thus far not articulated a clear ideal-typical alternative to Finnemore and Sikkink's model, which continues to dominate as a the starting point for mainstream norms research.

By going beyond the subject of *norm evolution* and instead examining the *evolution of normative practices*, I want to highlight the analytical usefulness of asking similar questions whose ontological assumptions are quite dissimilar. These alternatively asked questions provide a useful alternative picture of a key subtopic in international relations theory. With normative evolution, the object of research is not a static "fact," but an evolving organism. Thus, a theory of normative evolution must do more than explain a cause-and-effect relationship between norms and actions; this is, however, the extent of the theoretical depth addressed by mainstream IR

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[70] Martha Finnemore, 1993: 565-97; Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996; *contra* Lisbet Hooghe, "Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission," *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (2005): 865.

[71] James H. Lebovic, and Erik Voeten, "The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 1 (2009): 79-97.

norm research. Normative practices are the products of their contexts—in this case, the behaviors of the international units, including states, non-state actors, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, individual citizens, regimes, etc., as well as other substantive and procedural international practices. Normative practices constitute contestable mechanisms through which behaviors and identities of these same units are defined, and simultaneously expanded and constrained.[72] This mutual constitution of practices and identities complicates research on this topic. Thus, as I try to answer the question "how do normative practices evolve?" I will critically engage with the assumptions that underlie the norm life cycle model— the most popular model of international norm evolution—and then recreate a more interaction-oriented ideal-typified account of how normative practices evolve.

Chapter 2 details the methodology that serves as the foundation of this research. I define the philosophical ontological assumptions that motivate my use of Weberian ideal-typing. Since I have already outlined a brief critique of the literature on norm evolution, the following chapter is more concerned with questions of meta-theory that ought to be answered before beginning an empirical investigation.

In Chapter 3, I create an ideal-typical complex normative systems evolution model. As previously mentioned, this chapter will begin by critically engaging with Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle model. The ideal-type of complex normative systems evolution that I then create as I piece back together a vision of the international system, focuses on norms as practice. My normative evolution model assumes that international actors engage in hierarchical social interactions via social nodes and these nodes (which take the form of any public or private forum through which ideas are exchanged between two or more actors) are spaces in which

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[72] Klotz and Lynch, 2007.

norms evolve. The evolutionary process for normative systems is a function of the how actors frame and discursively justify their own practices and how external events, which alter actors' imaginations of what constitutes appropriate practice, causing actors to critically reflect on those practices and justifications. I compare the pragmatic benefits of my ideal-type compared to Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle model by highlighting the details that analysts can draw out from empirical cases by using my model.

Chapter 4 provides an empirical narrative of United States foreign policy regarding humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. This historical narrative focuses on three decisions: (1) the decision of the George H. W. Bush administration to intervene in Somalia under UNITAF (and Bill Clinton's subsequent decision to continue US engagement in that context); (2) the Clinton administration's decision to not intervene in Rwanda and to issue Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25)[73] and the very late decision to intervene in Bosnia; and (3) the United States' decision to partake in NATO's intervention in Kosovo absent UN Security Council authorization. The response to the Somali civil war and resulting humanitarian crisis is presented as a status quo ante interpretation by the H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations regarding appropriate justification of and conduct during international intervention. The cases of Rwanda and Kosovo, however, show dramatically divergent outcomes. I then include a brief discussion regarding the emergence of the responsibility to protect and conclude with a general overview of the main take-away points regarding instances of humanitarian intervention policy manifestation in the context of US decision-making in the 1990s. Each section revolves around a moment of critical self-reflection informed by previous events, and discusses changes to the United States' performance possibility range constituting what is deemed as appropriate humanitarian

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[73] "Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25)," *US State Department Bureau of International Organizational Affairs*, February 22, 1996.

intervention practices.

The conclusion, chapter 5, highlights adequate, incidental and coincidental causal factors related to the evolution of humanitarian intervention normative practices in the US context (drawn from chapter 4). I will conclude with a discussion regarding the potential exportation of my complex normative systems evolution model for international relations scholarship more generally.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

This chapter focuses on two inexorably linked questions: (1) what does a useful model of normative evolution to look like; and (2) *how* can we understand the evolution of normative practices? Theory explains what facts and laws cannot: "*why.*"[74] Like any *scientific* enterprise, a model of normative evolution should be rooted in Patrick Thaddeus Jackson's three criteria for broadly demarcating scientific research: first, that science is empirically systematic; second, that science opens itself to public criticism; and third, that scientific inquiry is concerned with worldly facts.[75] Max Weber also reminds us that one of the important contributions of science is "clarity," which I will elaborate on later.[76] Upon establishing these basic precepts, I will spend a little time articulating my own philosophical ontological assumptions as they relate to this research question.

First, my acceptance of the mutually constitutive nature of normative practices requires me to identify myself in the mind-world monist camp when seeking to address the research question posited herein. Although Jackson argues that paradigmatic IR Constructivism does not necessarily rejects neopositivism,[77] echoed by David Dessler's discussion of the Constructivist mainstreaming works of Peter Katzenstein and Alexander Wendt.[78] *Small-c constructivism*, as

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[74] Waltz, 1979.

[75] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*, New York: Routledge, 2010: 195.

[76] Max Weber, *The Vocation Lectures*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004: 25.

[77] Jackson, 2010: 201-207.

[78] David Dessler, "Constructivism within a Positivist Social Science," *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999): 124.

articulated by Nicholas Onuf and John Ruggie, is a philosophical ontological orientation rather than a scientific ontological one, and it can only be mind-world monist. Mutually constituted practices and their justificatory discourses "occupy a public space external to the individual minds of participants but not therefore independent of all minds in general."[79] Normative mutual constitution of practice and discourse is a case of the same general philosophical assumption underpinning mind-world monism. Mind-world monism assumes that "'the world as it is in itself' [is] a nonsensical notion, because any access that we have to the world is mediated by our conventional practices and values."[80] Normative systems (wherein normativity is given to practices rather than to content-based objects) also occupy a quasi-public space, existing simultaneously (1) internal to actors' conscious and subconscious visions of the world, and (2) as external constitutors of public practice and justifications—"the content of a social phenomenon's constitutive social relations… produces the formal properties of network[s],"[81] rules, norms, etc. The substantive subject of this research rests on small-c constructivists foundations, and thus requires a mind-world monist philosophical ontological orientation. This research—because of the very question it asks—is constructivist, not Constructivist. This is not a conflation of scientific and philosophical ontologies, as warned against by Jackson.[82]

Prominent scholars engage in creating and subsequently testing hypotheses regarding norms and ideas. Neopositivist hypothesis testing to answer questions regarding (1) potential

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[79] Jackson, 2010: 129.

[80] Ibid.: 125.

[81] Nexon, 2009: 64.

[82] Ibid.; 28-29.

effects of specific norms on conventional weapons proliferation,[83] (2) causes for the decay and/or disappearance of certain norms,[84] (3) the importance of actors' perceptions of situations when deciding whether to defend particular norms,[85] (4) the extent to which repression indicates violent norms within state, and (5) the effect of decolonization norms on state behavior,[86] are just a few examples. But neopositivist work does not extend to the study of practice/discourse-based complex normative systems; they only look at "norms as things"—otherwise, it would not be possible to consider them variables. Linking the *common underlying assumptions* between monist philosophical ontology and constructivist claims cautions against the proclivity by neopositivists to rearrange the substantive points I make herein into discrete testable hypotheses. As Jackson argues, neopositivists' position of power in exclusively claiming the mantle of science allows them to transform "thoroughgoing critique[s] and rejection[s] of neopositivism [into] a straightforward expansion of the neopositivist research agenda [by incorporating] novel cases and causal factors."[87]

Legitimating the rejection of neopositivism, Cox reminds us that the idea of a separation between "observer and observed" is a product of modernity, and that ancient perspectives see the

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[83] Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," In Peter J. Katzenstein (Ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 79-113.

[84] Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn, "Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 4 (2011): 719-742.

[85] Richard K. Herrmann and Vaughn P. Shannon, "Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making," *International Organization* 55, no. 3 (2001): 621-654.

[86] Goertz & Diehl, 1992.

[87] Jackson, 2010: 43.

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two as "reciprocally interacting in an unpredictable process of change."[88] This is, of course, a broader philosophy of science statement rejecting the unquestioning assumption that Popperian-Lakatosian-Kuhnian[89] conceptualizations are the only philosophical bases for proper accumulation of scientific knowledge (or, more dramatically: that neopositivist falsifiability constitutes the only defense against the descent into epistemological chaos caused by *relativism* and the logical absurdity of *induction*).

Dessler argues that social science positivism focuses overwhelmingly on a "generalizing" approach rather than a "particularizing" approach, and that mainstream IR Constructivists try to bridge the methodological gap between these two approaches (but still, arguably, work firmly within a positivist framework).[90] Despite the aforementioned, Dessler states that positivism "[necessitates]… one or more laws, since without a knowledge of regularities and recurring patterns in the world, we would have no reason to expect particular happenings at particular times."[91] The nomothetic nature of neopositivist research is harder to explain by the philosophical ontology that underlies it (Jackson offers that cross-case comparison is a method

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[88] Robert Cox, "The Point Is Not Just to Explain the World but to Change It," In Reus-Smit and Snidal (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008: 86-88. Cox's piece focuses on providing normative, ethical, and historical justifications for IR science as a catalyst for change than a philosophy of science justification. Cox does, however, provide a prescription for how to amend IR science as it is currently practiced: renouncing the automaticity with which parts of positivist/rationalist methodology are unreflectively applied.

[89] See Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979; Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London: Routledge, 2002; Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962; Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," In Sandra Harding (Ed.), *Can Theories be Refuted?*, Dortrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1976: 205-259.

[90] Dessler, 1999: 131, 137.

[91] Ibid.; 128.

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for easing Cartesian dualism, but this does not require that cross-case general laws exists).[92] Mind-world dualism does not require that the world side of the relationship be *ordered*. Although it may indeed be fruitful to pursue an "objective, mind-independent," *and ordered* world in natural sciences, the acknowledgement that within social science socially constructed ideas and narratives help determine outcomes suggests that perhaps social agency decreases the degree of order of reality, thereby problematizing the search for nomothetic generalizations.

Alongside my previously stated assumption of mind-world monism, I also find phenomenalism to be an appropriate philosophical ontological assumption to make regarding the relationship between researchers' knowledge and observational considerations. I frame this as a matter of *appropriateness* given my view that philosophical ontological assumptions are fluidly created in response to particular research questions. The question herein, "how do normative practices evolve?" does not lend itself to reflexivist analysis, whereby the goal of the research would be an emancipatory agenda of systematically denaturalizing substantive claims, rooted in mixture of monism and transfactualism. Instead, my question makes it "unnecessary… to 'transcend experience,'"[93] thus keeping a phemonenalist philosophical ontological wager as the underlying assumption thereof.

I place this philosophical ontological claim up front for two reasons. First, foregrounding philosophical ontological assumptions provides readers with certain expectations about what this scientific research can and cannot do. Given the particular assumptions employed herein, a reader should expect this research to analyze relationships among complex mutually constitutive social phenomena and arrive at certain context-specific conclusions about normative evolution.

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[92] Jackson, 2010: 70-71.

[93] Ibid.: 37

What this research cannot and will not do, however, is postulate conjectures in the form of testable hypotheses that would be compared to empirical data in order to falsify existing theories. The second reason for stating philosophical ontological assumptions up front is precisely so to avoid the sort of disciplining that Jackson warns is inappropriate.[94] By acknowledging the fundamental assumptions regarding "'hook-up' between the mind and the world" it is possible to highlight the fact that philosophical ontological wagers are "themselves incapable of being justified" or falsified.[95] Indeed, as Weber states, "No science is absolutely free of assumptions and none can satisfactorily explain its value to a person who rejects them."[96]

In the previous chapter I mention ideal-types a few times, particularly as I refer to Finnemore and Sikkink's ideal-typical model of the norm life cycle, but I do not define what an ideal-type actually is or what constitute its basic characteristics. For this, I turn to Max Weber, Patrick Jackson, and Daniel Nexon. According to Weber, "Ideal-types are… 'formed through a one-sided *accentuation* of *one* or *more* points of view and through bringing together a great many diffuse and discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* events, which are arranged according to these emphatically one-sided points of view in order to construct a unified *analytical construct* [*Gedanken*]. In its conceptual purity, this analytical construct [*Gedankenbild*] is found nowhere in empirical reality; it is a utopia' (Weber 1999a, 191)."[97] Jackson translates: "instead of a representation or a depiction, [an ideal-type] is a

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[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.: 196.

[96] Weber, 2004: 28.

[97] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "The Production of Facts: Social Science from an Analytical Standpoint," Presented at the *Annual Conference of the International Studies Association*, San Diego, 2013: 20; translated by Jackson from Max Weber, "Die 'Objektivität' Sozialwissenschaftlicher Und Sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis." In Elizabeth Flitner (Ed.),

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deliberate over-simplification of a complex empirical actuality for the purpose of highlighting certain themes or aspects that are never as clear in the actual world as they are in the ideal-typical depiction of it."[98] The simplified nature of ideal-types allows them to satisfy Weber's own assertion that science—particularly when applied to complex phenomena—ought to *clarify*.

Jackson reminds us that because ideal-types are "stated in a logically general form and feature broad statements about identity, discourse, economic flows, rationality, and so on" they are not to be "evaluate[d]… using broad empirics."[99] The purpose of the comparison of an ideal-type with an empirical narrative is not to amend the ideal-type, as the ideal-type is not empirically bound. Rather, the comparison, along with precise counterfactual reasoning, can help tease out otherwise unnoticeable context-specific variations that generalized, universalized, and/or quantified neopositivist hypothesis testing would overlook.

Nexon describes the usefulness of ideal typing as a function of the fact that ideal-types allow researchers to analyze approximations of isomorphisms among different cases of categorized phenomena. Accordingly, "researchers construct ideal types in order to create an idealization of a phenomenon's characteristics that can then be compared against other, related ideal typifications."[100] As such, ideal-typing allows researchers to overcome the aforementioned problem identified by Dessler as endemic to neopositivist research: that generalization is favored over particularization. Making generalized comparisons among isomorphic cases is

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Gesammelte Aufsätze Zur Wissenschaftslehre, Potsdam: Internet-Ausgabe, 1999: 191; see Nexon, 2009: 65.

[98] Jackson, 2010: 37.

[99] Ibid.: 152.

[100] Nexon, 2009: 65.

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complemented by an ideal-type's focus on a "singular causal analysis."[101] This ideal-typing simultaneously generalizes and particularizes.

The historical narrative[102] that follows in chapter 4 discusses a number of events that formulate the United States' posture towards humanitarian intervention in the 1990s including the Somali conflict, the Rwandan genocide, the war in Bosnia, the intervention in Kosovo, and the evolution of R2P. These might appear to be distinct cases. They are, however, a single continuous case of a long-term process: the evolution of normative practices related to humanitarian intervention. It is therefore useless to compare the United States' behavior during one of these events to behavior during another for the purpose of documenting what caused the observed outcome variation. The causal factors that result from such singular causal analysis differ from neopositivist causal variables in an important way. The goal of analyticist[103] research is not to determine which independent variables might have the greatest correlation coefficient with a dependent variable. Nor are analyticist causal factors treated as competing against one another. Instead, complex phenomena result from "the totality of all conditions back to which the causal chain leads."[104] Placing this in context of the present research question, Judith Kelley argues that "in addition to failing to account for all the different stages of the evolution of

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[101] see Ibid.; Jackson, 2010: 149.

[102] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006. The ideal-type could hardly function without a historical narrative precisely because "the success or failure of… causal mechanisms should be evaluated in terms of how they fare in producing a provisional victor out of actual historical debates surrounding particular policies" (45).

[103] For a detailed discussion of analyticism, see Jackson, 2010.

[104] Jackson, 2010: 147, translated by Jackson from Max Weber, "Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik," In Elizabeth Flitner (Ed.), *Gesammelte Aufsätze Zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Potsdam: Internet-Ausgabe, 1999: 289.

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[norms], a narrow focus on any one… [subpart] and a related narrow focus on singular causes might also miss the interactions among the causal factors in contributing to each individual stage."[105]

And since, as Jackson strongly articulates, "ideal-types cannot be falsified as one would falsify a hypothesis… the only meaningful way to evaluate whether an ideal-type is a good one or not is *pragmatically*: i.e., to examine whether, once applied, the ideal-type is efficacious in revealing intriguing and useful things about the objects to which it is applied."[106] Thus the empirical narrative articulated in chapter 4 is not used to evaluate the validity of chapter 3. Rather, the purpose of comparing the ideal-type and the empirical narrative is to "discriminate between adequate, coincidental, and incidental factors."[107]

In order to arrive at these causal factors, I seek to analyze the assumptions that underpin Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle ideal-type. Upon critically reflecting upon these assumptions I build a better-calibrated ideal-typified model of normative evolution that more usefully captures the processes by which complex normative systems evolve. From this discussion it becomes clear that the purpose of this research is (1) to construct a better calibrated ideal-type model of normative evolution—one that is more useful for research regarding normative practices than the popular norm life cycle model, and (2) to discover causal factors specific to the evolution of the normative practices regarding humanitarian intervention in the US context in the 1990s.

Ideal-typing a complex process such as the evolution of normative practices has a real

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[105] Kelley, 2008: 251.

[106] Jackson, 2013: 24-25.

[107] Ibid.

methodological advantage. As previously mentioned, analyticist methodology considers the "totality of causal factors" that form a causal chain in the direction of a particular outcome. Instead of isolating specific independent variables and compare each of them against a dependent variable—whereby each variable would be treated as discrete—I examine confluences of factors that come together in varying agglomerations and intensities. Rather than competing against each other (as regression analysis would produce: the one with the highest absolute value coefficient hast most impact on the dependent variable), these confluences of factors produce outcomes by interacting with one another. As I will build on in the following chapters, the factors I will highlight are (1) the presence of environmental stimuli caused by the interaction of a multiplicity of actors, which appears to be exogenous to the actor whose normative perspective we are analyzing and which shifts, constricts, or expands an actors performance possibility range; and (2) a moment of critical self-reflection by the actor we are analyzing, who must generate a justificatory discourse for its actions that makes sense of the aforementioned environmental stimuli.

CHAPTER 3

COMPLEX NORMATIVE SYSTEMS EVOLUTION MODEL

The literature on the evolution of norm-governed behavior is heavily influenced by the work on norm life cycles by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. Finnemore and Sikkink provide an important contribution to the understanding of norm evolution in international relations; they articulate an ideal-type that continues to be used by other scholar as a foundational text for analyzing how norms evolve. Although other scholars have, as I show in chapter 1, criticized the applicability of particular parts of the norm life cycle model or have sought to add to its complexity, it is difficult to find mainstream scholarship that challenges the model's underlying assumptions about what *norms are* or whether Finnemore and Sikkink's description of norms as objects—discrete packets of repeated behavior bound by their internal content—are useful descriptions that can provide insights about changes within complex systems of normative practices.

Informed by Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True's work on "norms as process,"[108] I begin this chapter by unpacking the basic assumptions of Finnemore and Sikkink's model. The (1) definition of what constitutes a norm (squarely a "norms as things" conceptualization), and (2) assumption that norms exist within a liberal world system are the root of the relative analytical weakness of the norm life cycle model. Doing away with the norm life cycle's two most limiting internal assumptions leaves a few unanswered questions—about the nature of the international system and how normative systems exist and change—that I answer as I build my own complex normative systems evolution model. I also focus my attention on the social linkages that give actors the ability to demonstrate and articulate conceptualizations of appropriate practices, and

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[108] See Krook and True, 2010.

from those linkages describe an ideal-typical model of complex normative systems evolution that is better able to highlight the dynamism intrinsic to normative practices. The success of this complex normative systems evolution model relative to the norm life cycle model is dependent on the degree to which it is better able to provide analysts with insights that the latter model cannot uncover.

<div align="center">Revisiting the Norm Life Cycle Model</div>

Although norms are the sort of ideational factors typically associated with Constructivist international relations research, Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle operates within an assumed liberal institutionalist world, wherein interdependence and institutionalist cooperation form the basis for combatting the deleterious effects of international systemic anarchy. Although international norms constitute a substratum for most international behaviors, norm-seeking behavior of states is rationally motivated during most phases of the norm life cycle model according to Finnemore and Sikkink, who explicitly state, "norms and rationality are… intimately connected."[109]

Norms, operating within Finnemore and Sikkink's assumptions about the nature of the international system, are thus an additional ordering mechanism for that institution-mitigated anarchical international system insofar as actors—the most prominent of which remain states and international organizations—can agree to certain common interests (i.e. prohibiting certain methods of warfare, protecting human rights, combatting corrupt governance, valuing growth over equality through laissez-faire market economic models, etc.). States retain their primacy as the adopters and *enforcers* of norms; international organizations and non-state actor networks are

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[109] Finnemore and Sikkink, 1996: 888.

(secondarily) important because they contributing to state socialization and agenda-setting.

As summarized in chapter 1, Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle model of norm evolution consists of three phases. During the first stage of norm evolution (emergence), norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms are the primary actors. Finnemore and Sikkink argue, "*all* norm promoters at the international level need some kind of organization platform,"[110] implicitly assuming that ideas require organizational power backings to successfully proliferate and become integral to related discourses. Although it is important to note the relative strength of ideas that have the backing of organizations and large actor networks, it is equally important to acknowledge that ideas that lack such support do not necessarily get instantly discarded from related discourses. Instead, such ideas, despite having very little organizational backing, can still help set the discursive tone; they can at least function as known options, which in turn can catalyze the demand for alternatives. And such independent ideas can develop an organizational platform long after they become central to ongoing debates in related discourses (i.e. the Occupy Wall Street movement).

What is at stake in this discussion is the notion that only the powerful have the tools and potential to meaningfully impact discourses and create norm frameworks. *Contra* Finnemore and Sikkink, any actor at any level can influence the discussion regarding international issues insofar as that actor possesses not an organizational platform, but a medium for informational exchange. Lene Hansen alludes to sources of ideas that do not have formal authority (i.e. opinions, editorials, etc.), which do not necessarily have institutional/organizational support, as textual materials that influence discourse. Widely circulated blog posts—which often do not have any institutional backing—can even impact actor's framings of key issues. These vary in breadth of

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[110] Ibid.: 899. Emphasis added.

reach and clarity of articulation. [111] A platform helps, but it is not necessary for norm emergence. The motives of norm entrepreneurs, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, include altruism, empathy, and ideational commitments and the dominant mechanism employed by these actors is persuasion.[112] The norm life cycle's placement of altruistic actor motivations solely within the first stage of norm evolution is highly problematic as it limits the ability of analysts using the model to conceptualize motivations not reducible to individual cost/benefit calculations for phase 2 and 3 actors.

During the second stage of norm evolution (cascade), the primary actors include states, international organizations, and actor networks.[113] Whereas Finnemore and Sikkink's norms are adopted not only by states, international organizations, and actor networks, a broader view of norms extends cascades to individuals who constitute the human resources of those entities. Other norms are adopted more broadly yet: but entire segments of societies whose participation in domestic and international political and economic life enables higher-level actors to maintain their own perspectives regarding norm issues. It would be difficult for a state to ascribe to certain international norms if those norms were not at least de facto accepted by at least a subsection of the population (i.e. a majority or plurality of citizens or among ruling elites). Similarly, norms adopted by international organizations, themselves having their own bureaucratic interests,[114] must be supported by a portion of the membership *and* by the governing bureaucracy. Cascade

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[111] See Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, London: Routledge, 2006: 87.

[112] Finnemore & Sikkink, 1996: 898.

[113] Ibid.: 898.

[114] Barnett & Finnemore, 2004

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actors, according to the norm life cycle model, achieve their motives of enhancing legitimacy, esteem, and reputation through the dominant mechanisms of socialization, institutionalization, and demonstration. Yes, actors are socialized into particular environments and thus they learn norms and normative structures that already exist within the international system. Some actors can teach others how to behave through demonstration of "appropriate conduct" and those who are "taught" seek to imitate and receive positive feedback from their peers. Not all actors seek, however, to receive the teachings of others. Nor do all actors seek the approval or legitimation from the international community.

During the third stage of norm evolution (internationalization), the primary "actors" include the law, professions, and bureaucracies. The motives for these so-called "actors" are conformity and the dominant mechanisms for internalizing norms include behavioral habit and institutionalization.[115] Habitual and institutionalized behaviors are, however, not indicative of agency among those who conduct themselves accordingly. Given that internalization is the process through which behaviors become invisible and naturalized, it would be questionable in my view to classify the processes that bring about this stage of the norm life cycle model "actors"—certainly not in the same sense as the actors described in the antecedent two phases.

Finnemore and Sikkink argue that internalization means that actors "no longer [choose] to conform to [norms] in any meaningful way."[116] Internalization, according to the norm life cycle model, necessitates that actors' daily engagement with their environments is possible through habits rather than decisions. Although many daily behaviors are indeed subconscious and deeply rooted in habit, others which had been similarly subconscious and deeply rooted in

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[115] Finnemore & Sikkink, 1996: 898.

[116] Ibid.: 913.

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habit might once again be brought to the forefront of consciousness by environmental stimuli that cause actors to reflect upon their actions. Internalization is thus not an endpoint along a teleological progression. Rather, subconscious and habitual behaviors are capable of being contested in a manner similar to the contestation of non-internalized behaviors—the difference is that internalized behaviors require a higher environmental stimulus to cause an actor to engage in critical self-reflection because the behavior is itself generally more naturalized. Indeed, as the works of feminist, post-colonial, Marxist, and green theory scholars suggest, it is possible to denaturalize assumptions, ideas, and behaviors.

More notably than the aforementioned internal characteristics of each phase of the norm life cycle, the norm life cycle itself is actually not a cycle. It is instead a linear model, and as such, I contend that the norm life cycle should not be seen as a norm *evolution* model, but a norm *consolidation* model. Figure 3.1 is a reproduction of Finnemore and Sikkink's diagram of the norm life cycle. The simple linear progression from new idea to internalized international norm has limited analytical utility in describing ideational/policy feedback loops. In particular, it is unclear how behaviors based on internalized norms reinforce actors' identities and problematize spontaneous emergence of *new* ideas, precisely because these processes are *not linear*. Furthermore, consider that the norm life cycle is an ideal-type for the progression of an individual idea and its proliferation among actors in the international system. Notice how the norm that started in phase one is the same norm that we see in phase three—that is it is bound by the same internal content? How do other ideas interact with an idea that finds itself in one of the phases of the norm life cycle? This question is centrally related to the dynamism of the model. If the norm life cycle model assumes that particular ideas tend to follow its articulated linear pathway, it is nearly impossible to analyze interaction effects among variations of ideas,

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Figure 3.1. Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle model

Norm emergence		"Norm cascade"	Internalization
Stage 1	Tipping	Stage 2	Stage 3

justifications, and discourses (for instance, various conceptualizations of types of humanitarian intervention and their appropriateness, which when analyzed cumulatively look like one cohesive normative framework, but when analyzed more closely are clearly competing variations of related possible behavioral outcomes).

<u>Reimagining the International System</u>

A vision of the international system based on assumptions of anarchy mitigated by liberal cooperation limits the quality of the norm life cycle model because it provides little new analytical leverage. It would be more analytically helpful to envision international relations as a phenomenon that occurs among actors in an international system that provides for regular interaction along interaction nodes. Interaction nodes are fundamental building blocks of international society in the sense articulated by Nicholas Onuf, that: "Social arrangements need not possess sovereignty or any other formal feature of the state, much less a high degree of centralization in enforcement capacities, to qualify as political societies."[117] Interaction nodes exist ontologically prior to any other international "structure" by virtue of the fact that actors who operate at the international level socialize with one another in various forums and formats. Indeed, "international relations form a bounded and distinctive *social* reality."[118] Only if all

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[117] Onuf, 2013: 167-8.

[118] Ibid.: 6. Emphasis added.

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international actors—from states to transnational networks to individual activists, etc.—walled themselves off and had no contact with one another would interaction nodes not exist as spaces for the exchange of knowledge and ideas. Interaction nodes look quite different depending on the actors who participate in them.

What do interaction nodes look like? Opportunities for actors to interact with one another are manifold. First, interaction opportunities present differently to different *types* of actors. Interactions among states can result from various social arrangements that cause inter-state contact, including but not limited to: contiguous borders; common membership to international or regional organizations; military or political alliances; resource interests in other states; large Diaspora populations from other states; or cross-border natural disaster. For non-state actors (ranging from NGOs and international organizations to transnational criminal and terrorist groups) these interactions arise as: operating within or among particular states; affiliations with similar groups; serving or representing particular constituencies. This is not an exhaustive list. Before I continue, I have to clarify that specific social spaces that function as interaction nodes, such as particular international organizations, are, of course, not ontologically prior to international systemic characteristics; rather, social spaces in the general, abstract sense are the ontologically prior foundation to which I am referring.

Secondly, the spaces within which actors engage with one another constitute interaction nodes. Examples of interaction nodes include physical forums institutionalized through international organizations. The UN Security Council, for instance, serves as an interaction node for members-states who debate "international peace and security" within its institutional framework. The Council serves not only as a forum for its members but as a platform for articulating views to a broader global audience—a trait that is less visible amidst the back and

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forth arguing of member states. Bilateral meetings or negotiations, and multilateral summits are also forms of interaction nodes. These interaction nodes are formal and visible, with clearly articulated rules. Others can be modest, invisible, customary, or mundane. Phone calls, emails, and other forms of communication between individual actors can allow them to express positions and thus function as spaces of social interaction. Sports gatherings among leaders, retreats, receptions, vacation destinations, campaign stops, and press conferences all function as interaction nodes.

The density of actor networks within and across interaction nodes impacts the degree to which particular ideas be exported to other interaction nodes where more actors yet might be exposed to them. The most dense actor networks could act as slippery spirals in which certain ideas get proliferated quickly and widely. The success of transnational actors in reframing dominant narratives regarding the use of anti-personnel mines, leading to the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines, serves as an example of a slippery spiral.[119]

Third, interaction nodes create a platform in which the broad rules of appropriate conduct within the international system are formulated and practiced through a diversity of arrangements and agreements among states and non-state actors.[120] Actors who gather in social nodes bring with them certain practices, interpretations of what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, and represent the appropriateness of their practices in different ways. These actors frame issues according to their own consciences as well as according to intersubjectively

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[119] See Price, 1998.

[120] Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 81. Wendt argues "processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures—cooperative or conflictual—that shape actors' identities and interests and the significance of their material contexts."

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constructed ethical frameworks. Processes of interaction among actors within interaction nodes are internal to specific interaction nodes—i.e. their structure, method of allotting communication time and space, degree of equal access to set the agenda, etc.—and to actors—i.e. their dominant cognitive and/or bureaucratic functions, their preference for or gravitation towards certain types of reasoning,[121] etc.

Material and discursive power asymmetries make interactions among certain actors— such as states interacting within the UN Security Council—decidedly hierarchical. Indeed, some actors are not even in the room during certain discussions, debates, or decisions. Additionally, some interaction nodes are more relevant to broad international decision-making. A loose hierarchy among interaction nodes is observable. It is difficult to dispute that actors' interactions within the UN Security Council are more likely to affect world politics writ large (because actors' have antecedently agreed to give the outcome of those proceedings force of international law) than the governing commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), although there may be instances when interaction processes there within may lead to outcomes that are relatively more influential among its own members.

In addition to visible hierarchies within and among interaction nodes, gendered, racial, class-based, and other invisible forms of hierarchies are present. Interaction nodes are gendered when particular nodes, which are representational of constructed masculinities, are given greater legal, institutional, and cultural preference.[122] Actors within interaction nodes also tend to order

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[121] Onuf, 2013: 106.

[122] See V. Spike Peterson, *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1992; Tickner, 2001; Laura Sjoberg, *Gendering Global Conflict: Towards a Feminist Theory of War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

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themselves and their peers using gendered references to power, capabilities, and outcomes. Racial hierarchy is constructed within and among interaction nodes through spatial-temporal othering of non-Northern, non-Western actors and nodes.[123] Class-based hierarchies are present within interaction nodes when certain social groups are given interactive preference.[124]

Whereas hierarchies among international organizational interaction nodes might be legally articulated—in the sense that specific conventions and treaties give certain organizations particular functions, powers, and statuses (i.e. the UN Security Council is given primacy as the highest international forum for discussing and deciding policy related to international peace and security; the decisions that result from member interactions are binding onto all UN member states and on a number of other international and regional organizations). Institutionalized hierarchies within and among interaction nodes often require changes to formal agreements, conventions, treaties, and other documents to change. Other hierarchies are rhetorically and discursively constructed, often justified as appropriate, moral, ethical, or "right" according to other standards. Although gendered and racial/national hierarchies are persistent features of a large number of human relations, invisible hierarchies are subject to constant contestation and thus the positionality of nodes (or actors within nodes) can change without the need for official amendments to institutionalizing documents.

The alignment of actors along internally and externally hierarchical interaction nodes changes the way we see international relations. Some actors are inherently disadvantaged when engaging in discursive justification of particular practices whereas others have the upper hand.

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[123] For a discussion of Todorov's double movement—the notion that different "others" are inferior, and that the "other" can only achieve equality by assimilating, see Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004.

[124] Neumann, 2012: 10.

How actors choose the forums in which they articulate their positions and the very language they find most appropriate to do so are questions that remain throughout this work. Nonetheless, the gap in understanding is relatively small compared to what we have gained: an analytical model that articulates how normative practices evolve.

What does this mean with respect to the empirics in chapter 4? First, although I limit my research to an interaction node composed of high-level US government officials, thus making inter-nodal hierarchy less important in the context of this research, actors within the specified interaction node organize hierarchically. Foreign policy-making executive branch officials operate within a clearly defined chain of command and order of protocol. This means that the arguments and analyses of some are more likely to be heard and implemented. Second, the routes through which information is communicated within this particular interaction node is limited by the information thinning process—that is, information that makes it up the chain of command to cabinet undersecretaries, Secretaries, military and intelligence officials, the White House Chief of Staff, and finally the President gets filtered significantly from the depth with which is introduced at its point of origin (perhaps at the level of a policy analyst in the State Department, CIA, or Defense Department). The exchange of a multiplicity of viewpoints can be curtailed through the vertical information flow process; the viewpoints of lower-level staff might be completely omitted from the reports seen by higher-level staff. Finally, class, race, gender, and other invisible hierarchies are employed within interaction nodes by actors debating various topics. This is most clearly visible in the aforementioned empirical case through the othering discourse employed to justify non-intervention in Rwanda. More importantly, other interaction nodes—such as the UN Security Council, or bilateral talks with Rwanda's neighboring states, former colonial powers, and US allies, are given secondary status or less. The solutions

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developed within the interaction node within which nearly all analyzed actors interact with one another—in this case, the foreign policy-making elements of the US executive branch—is given moral and operational primacy.

As aforementioned, actors also bring with them antecedent formulations (partially via previous other cross-actor encounters within interaction nodes) of appropriate conduct. Interaction nodes serve as negotiating and learning spaces for procedural habit development and substantive idea exchange. Despite this, coalitions along convergent process habits and ideas may naturally develop as actors seek support among their peers. Likewise, as Andrew Hurrell discusses regarding the emergence of a global culture of human rights, interaction nodes are spaces where actors can arrive at a "shared common language" regarding the issues they face and their proposed solutions to those issues.[125] This implies that actors who coalesce around certain similar practices and discourses of appropriate conduct necessarily minimize the differences in action preference and ideational interpretation that is inherent to each having his/her own cognitive space that acts as a lens for understanding all incoming worldly data.

<div align="center">Complex Normative System Evolution Model</div>

Over the following pages I will define what complex normative systems are, how they are maintained within international interaction nodes, and an ideal-typical account of how they change. The starting point of *my* model, which assumes the aforementioned international systemic properties, is similar to Krook and True's position: normative practices "that spread across the international system tend to be vague, enabling their content to be filled in many ways and thereby to be appropriated for a variety of different purposes. In contrast to more fixed

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[125] Hurrell, 2007: 304.

notions, [this research views normative practices] as 'processes', as works-in-progress, rather than as finished products."[126] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon define processes as "causally or functionally linked set[s] of *occurrences or events* which produce 'change in the complexion of reality'… [and that]… "all process is reducible to the doings of (nonprocessual) things."[127] Accordingly, practices, as defined below, constitute the events that (re)produce the "complexion of reality."

Practices (iterated actions and behaviors undertaken by various actors, whose cumulative linkage produces mutually understood rules[128]) and utterances (linguistic formulations that articulate reasons that specific performances of practice-guided action[129] are appropriate or not appropriate) constitute social behavioral patterns. Practices are "socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world."[130] Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot argue "practice is [a set of] performance[s]—that is, a process of doing something" and that practices are "pattered in that they generally exhibit certain regularities over time and space."[131] Performances and practices are justified by the actors carrying them out through justificatory utterances and discourses.

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[126] Krook and True, 2010: 104.

[127] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, and Daniel H. Nexon, "Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999): 302. Emphasis added.

[128] Emanuel Adler, and Vincent Pouliot, *International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011: 6.

[129] Hereinafter simply: "action."

[130] Ibid.

[131] Ibid.: 7.

What comes first, an action or its justificatory utterance? This is actually a misleading question because I contend this binary is false; instead, they are simultaneously coproduced. Iver Neumann describes that "practices are discursive, both in the sense that some practices involve speech-acts and in the sense that practice cannot be thought of 'outside' of discourse."[132] Indeed, to argue that an action precedes its justificatory discourse implies that practices are random and only legimiated post facto, that knowledge does not inform practice at all. That cannot be the case, since "at any one time, discourse is the precondition for action. Discourses offer a distinct set of socially recognized actions, as well as means for recognizing when they are appropriate and how they should be performed."[133] The converse, that justification discourses *only* precede action, is similarly nonsensical because it implies something can be justified before it exists. Justification for a prior practice might provide the foundation for the justification of another, but neither practices nor their justifications can be simply plucked out of some exogenous ether. Instead, "practice rests on *background knowledge*, which it embodies, enacts, and reifies all at once. Knowledge not only precedes practice as do intentions, beliefs, etc. In addition, intersubjectivity is bound up in the performance and can only be expressed as such."[134] There is an inseparable link between doing something and defining why that something is good, moral, efficient, appropriate, in line with tradition, and/or what good people do.

As alluded to in chapter 1, there are two primary types of justification: asocial and social. Asocial justification is internal to the actor, it is often achieved subconsciously, as a quotidian

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[132] Iver B. Neumann, *At Home With the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012: 58.

[133] Ibid.: 57.

[134] Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 8.

cognitive function—borrowing a term from Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, internal justificatory devices that underlie practice are tacit "softwares of the mind."[135] Actors justify practices foremost to themselves, and they do this as practices unfold. With asocial justification, it is relatively easy to see that that action and justification occur simultaneously. This is because individuals often do not reflect on their own practices and habits. Instead they just *do*. They would not act in certain ways if actors conceived that their practices were not somehow connected to a grander vision of appropriateness that preempted their actions from being amoral, unethical, inefficient, pragmatic, iconoclastic, or indicative of weak character. Even things that are socially constructed as wrong—for instance, stealing—might be interally justified by an individual as moral if it served a purpose that individual thought was more important than the general socially erected prohibition of theft—for instance, one might internally justify theft by reasoning that attaining enjoyment from a stolen product is of greater value (and thus, appropriate) than the ethical arguments against stealing.

Social justification refers to the external justification of practices and habits. Because actors possess different interests, on account of the various subconscious cognitive ways they interally justify their own actions, they often must explain their justifications to external audiences who do not share those practices. This is a good place to reiterate the importance of interaction nodes as social spaces where such justificatory discourses are produced through the exchange of ideas and by demonstrating various practices.

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[135] Geert Hofstede, Gert J. Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*. New York: McGraw Hill, 2010. Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov discuss culture as "software of the mind." I use their nomenclature as I refer to more general normative behavioral patterns, which may not necessarily be rooted in culture.

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Figure 3.2. Artificially Isolated Practices and Justification Clusters

With the previous paragraphs by way of introduction, I can transition to a discussion of figure 3.2, which shows two artificially isolated practice and justification clusters. Shaded areas *A* and *B* represent actors' practices and habits. In this figure, I contend that practices and habits *A* and *B* are not particular, but general—that is, they refer not to specfic behaviors during particular events like "non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994," as would be expected when using a "norms as things" framework. Instead, *A* and *B* are broader behavioral patterns such as respecting sovereignty-based arrangements generally. Numbers 1.1-4.1 represent configurations of ideas, representations, and discourses that are used by actors to internally justify their practices.

Although justification discourses can be divided in *n* categories according to an infinite range of formulations, it is useful to hightlight a few abstract categories that are exceptionally common and salient justifying utterances: (1.1) appeals to morality and ethics; (2.1) appeals to efficiency and pragmatism; (3.1) appeals to tradition and habit; and (4.1) appeals to civility and

strength of character. The separation of these justificatory utterances into separate categories is an analytical tool that signifies simply that different justifications can exist, and that similar justifications for a broad array of practices can serve as sources of discursive linkage. Indeed, the way in which specific types of justifactory utterances—particularly underlying different practices and actions—matters because similar utterances can be a source of linkages among different types of actoins and practices (as we later see in figure 3.3). In reality, these clusters would likely often overlap or would anchor one another.[136] For instance, actors might construe efficiency *to be* moral because that society values the efficient allocation of finite resources as a concept of justice.

The distinction between justification and practice, which I argued earlier is a false binary, is only retained in figure 3.2 (and later in figure 3.3), and depicted using concentric circles, to represent the external nature of non-linguistic (that is, material) practices and the internal nature of self-justificatory cognitive functions. The arrows that emanate from each linguistic justification utterance type represent utterances made by actors for external audiences. I chose to maintain this artificial border between discourse and practice in my ideal-typical illustrations in order to highlight that although empirically these phenomena are difficult to neatly separate, analysts who study complex normative systems might find it useful to retain this analytical lens because in order to ask questions about how linguistic and non-linguistic practices that affect actors internally and that are presented by actors to others evolve through actors' own engagement with others at interaction nodes.

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[136] Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 20. Although Adler and Pouliot discuss "subordination" of practices—that is "some practices 'anchor' others in making them possible… in these hierarchical bundles, one practice may become the dominant form of a set of subordinate practices, which may nonetheless continue to be practiced," I reappropriate the term to also apply to types of justificatory discourses.

Process *a* shows that justifications, presented to external audiences, are often reformulated to fit the social context or to resonate with particular listeners. 2.2 is a variation of 2.1 that an actor uses to justify normative practice *A*. Notice that arrow *a* and all the other arrows leading in and out of justifying utterances exhibit bidirectionality. This is because each justifying utterance type is always contested as actors interact with one another. By being listeners to other actors' discursive justification utterances, actors reinterpret their own commitments even as they seek to express those commitments to others (although the positionality of particular actors can affect the degree to which they "listen" and the network of other actors whose justifications are deemed relevant). Contestation is a permanent and omnipresent feature of normative justification. This does not imply that change comes easily. Indeed, as Neumann points out, "practices play out according to the stories that discourse holds out for them to play. When, as is usually the case, practices confirm these stories, they tell confirming stories of their own back to discourse. If all goes as it is set up to go, the result is social invariance."[137] There is strong inertia built into the relationship between discourse and practice because each defines and reifies the meaning of the other.

According to my graphic representation, normative practices *A* and *B* are different because the practices themselves might differ. Extending the previous example, some actors might act with strong deference for the sovereign arrangements of other actors whereas others might engage in general rejection or non-compliance of some elements of general sovereign arrangements. Here it is worth noting that actors that engage in practice *A* might use very different justification utterances to represent the value of their practices to themselves and others.

There are two problems with this depiction: (1) isolated practice and justification

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[137] Neumann, 2012: 93.

clusters, like the ones shown in figure 3.2, represent *potential* normative patterns in that justifications for practices are not inherently normative; and (2) "if all meanings were potentially open to context…" how is it that… "history keeps generating hegemonies that, for long periods, seem also to impose a degree of order and stability on the world?"[138] To address the first issue, practice and justification clusters become normative when actors layer their practices and justifications thereof into complex matricies of interlinked (other) practices and justifications. Thus, what I consider to be *normative* has less to do with the horizontal proliferation of practice or justificatory patterns across actors (as is the case in Finnemore and Sikkink's model), and more to do with the density of linkages among the practice and justification clusters that constitute actors' behavioral dispositions, and the positionality of practice and justification clusters within them. Figure 3.3 is an ideal-typical representation of the linkages among practice and justification clusters. The large cluster in the center of the diagram represents an overarching pattern of practices and justifications that are informed by other clusters that are bound by more narrow substantive cores (represented by the circle of smaller clusters that are linked to the larger one and to one another). Rather than representing internal content similiarity, the distances among smaller clusters and the justification patterns of the core cluster to which they are linked represents the prominence of the former in constituting a cognitive foundation the other clusters to which they are linked, including the core. Thus, tighter linkages among clusters indicates greater normative salience of particular behaviors and representations related to those clusters.

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[138] Ibid.: 55.

Figure 3.3. Ideal-Typical Representation of Practice and Justification Cluster Linkages

The number of clusters and their links to one another can be infinite—there can be many core and many peripheral clusters—and together they constitute what I refer to as *complex normative systems*. It is important to reiterate that a central feature of these complex normative systems is that the normativity of the clusters that constitute them comes from the processes by which actors link sets of practice and justificatory patterns, rather than the substantive content of each cluster since in reality it is difficult to empirically separate the internal and external content of similar clusters (because individuals' practices and justifications shift and overlap). Doing so would also return us to the "norms as things" formulation that reduces norms to discrete objects that possess their own causal agency (at the expense of agency of actors who, after all, are the ones who engage in normative practice).

To answer the second question requires me to begin addressing how complex normative systems change over time. Changes in how practices are justified do not necessitate that the practices themselves have dramatically changed. Similarly, changes in practices do not

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necessitate that the justification for new practices are dramatically different from justifications for old ones. So if we are stuck analyzing only practices and the ways in which they are justified, but we admit that shifts in either are insufficient to constitute shifts in the other, how can we ascertain any meaningful understanding of patterns of dramatic change?[139] Neumann's quote from above provides a hint that change is possible, but that it comes from the failure of discursive stories to reify practices and the failure of practice to provide stories that reify discourse. Recall, Neumann says, "*If all goes as it is set up to go*, the result is social invariance."[140] The conceptual challenge is that "language also has biases towards reification."[141] That means that by using certain terms to refer to things as objects, we cannot imagine a world in which those things do not exist as objects. If we talk about states, we presuppose the existence of things called states whose defining statehood constitutes their identities and their behavioral patterns; if we talk about anarchy, we presuppose that there exists a thing called anarchy that acts as a structural constraint on international actions; if we talk even of interaction nodes, we reduce our ability to imagine a world without them.[142] To understand change, it is important to understand the interaction between environmental circumstances that give actors pause, demanding of them that they reflect on their practics and/or on the justificatory utterances that underlie those practices are integral to understanding why change happens.

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[139] The key word here is *dramatic*. Of course, if we consider discourse and practice to be inexorably linked, a change in one must bring about some sort of change in the other. I contend that a change in one *may* bring about sweeping change, it *must* only bring about a micro-change in the other, and that dramatic change thus requires additional explanation.

[140] Neumann, 2012: 93. Emphasis added.

[141] See Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 300.

[142] See Jackson, 2010: 28.

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The ontological foundation of this work assumes that actors produce their worldviews through interaction with others and through the resulting exchange of ideas and the intersubjective production of pragmatic knowledge. This ontological and epistemological statement notwithstanding, generally actors do not explicitly see the intersubjective processes in which they tacitly take part. The world *appears* to be mind-independent. Thus, actors engage with their environments often without conceptualizing the degree of influence over that environment their engagement has. Actors within "the created, invented world…"—in this case, including the existence of norms created through constant cross-actor engagement within interaction nodes—"…'[obey] rules that they have themselves imposed on their own creations.'"[143] Normative systems simultaneously constrain practices and make certain practices possible; they constitute the boundaries of actors' imagination.[144]

Actors problem-solve and cope with environmental changes, shocks, shifts, and other fluctuations—which appear to actors as new events, new practices, new justifications, new normative frameworks, etc. New events require actors to sometimes reassess the their own imaginative boundaries and to seek new solutions to new problems. As actors create responses to new environmental stimuli, they might require new practices and justificatory discourses to make sense of those new stimuli, and these new practices and justificatory discourses might either reify or contest present ones. The tacit contestation of justificatory discourses and of practices that is inherent to the existence of cross-actor social interaction becomes more pronounced when actors

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[143] Hayward Alker, "Rescuing Reason from the Rationalists: Reading Vico, Marx and Weber as Reflective Institutionalists," In Hayward Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for the Social Sciences,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996: 211.

[144] Onuf, 2013: 86.

perceive environmental events as requiring new practice and discursive responses. Actors engage in tacit and overt reflective reconceptualization of practices and their justificatory utterances based on various environmental changes, including but not limited to pressure from other actors, endogenous disatisfaction with status quo outcomes, systemic shocks, unforseen circumstances (that although produced by actors' complex interactions, are seen as exogenous to actors themselves), etc. "Reflexivity and judgement are… at the foundation of practice transformation."[145]

Take, for instance, a linear representation of an actor's perceived possible practices (starting with range I; we will get to variants II and III later) in figure 3.4. The range of performance possibilities extends from ends 1 to 2 (represented by the arrow connecting them), which form imaginative brick walls, delineate the boundaries of actors' practices. Imaginative brick walls are constructed by actors themselves, as they assign meaning to environmental phenomena and relate it to their antecedently constructed practices and justifications. Most importantly, performance possibility ranges represent the full spectrum of possible actions and policies deemed appropriate (that is, performance ranges show those performances that are deemed an appropriate behavior given what is appropriate as an overarching practice) constitute the parameters of practice. When we talk about the evolution of normative practices, we therefore talk about the evolution of performance possibility ranges. For range I, performance *a* and *b* are within the range of imagined possible performance, whereas performance *c* is beyond that range. New events, actions, behaviors, and practices created or implemented by other actors can reduce or expand other actors' performance possibility ranges. For range II, which represents a constricted performance possibility range, made so by an external event causing the

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[145] Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 16.

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Figure 3.4. Performance Possibility Ranges and Environmental Changes

I.

    1.   a.   b.   2.   c.

II.

    1.   a.   2.   b.   c.

III.

    1.   a.   b.   c.   2.

actor to reflect on previous actions, performance *b* now also falls beyond the performance possibility range—I argue later that this is precisely the sort of constricting self-reflection regarding practice the Clinton administration underwent after the battle of Mogadishu. Another external event altogether might cause an expansionary self-reflection within an actor so that previous possibilities.

Range III shows this expansion of performance possibilities whereby performance *c* is now a completely new possible performance, and performance *b* returns as an imagined option. The United States' perceived capacity to enact a "new world order" after the breakup of the Soviet Union constitutes an expansion in the United States' performance possibility range. Practices move beyond or within actors' performance possibility ranges as actors reassess each practice in terms of their own procedural characteristics and their justificatory discourses relative to other linked practice and justification clusters. Conversely, in amending a set of clusters to fit within a newly expanded performance possibility range, actors *graft* meanings[146] from similar clusters in order to populate the new imaginative space with practices and justificatory

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[146] For a discussion regarding grafting, see Price, 1998.

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discourses that link in some ways to their existing conceptualizations of normative conduct.

How do particular patterns of discourse and practice overcome others during moments of critical self-reflection and environmental stress? First, "in the form of power that Foucault calls governmentality, people monitor and govern their own practices by drawing on stories that discourse holds out."[147] Accordingly actors would appear to seek to build linkages between existing and emerging discourses and practices so as to make sense of the latter in terms of the former. According to this formulation, "power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations"[148]—precisely the kind of relations we might see at interaction nodes wherein actors have different discursive and action capacities, different statuses, and among which there is a general hierarchy as described earlier. Onuf compellingly argues, "eventually [an actor] feel[s] no obligation to seek [others'] agreement; [the actor] merely invokes the convention"[149]—that is in this case, the internalized and/or customary nature of the behaviors in question. Onuf's continuing description conveys my thoughts elegantly: practices "… acquire additionally normativity, that is, they generate expectation not dependent on fresh agreements. Institutionalized conventions are... more visible and harder to ignore. Because they are normatively stronger, it is more difficult to change the content of the instruction contained in the convention, but it is not impossible."[150]

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[147] Neumann, 2012: 171.

[148] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction*, New York: Vintage Books, 1990.

[149] Onuf, 2013: 85.

[150] Ibid.

Before moving on to chapter 4, where we will take a temporary break from the dense vocabulary of this chapter, I want to make one additional point. With an increase in the number of and heterogeneity among *legitimate* actors in the international system—which cannot be ignored given the extent of globalization—one would expect that a greater diversity of narratives, stories, and experiences to inform actors' practices and justifications. Particularly if a significant number of heterogeneous international actors have relatively equitable power among them, some normative practices (particularly those that become institutionalized by the force of international law) may be harder to reach through genuine consensus—herein defined as general agreement among all parties enacted via minimal coercion. Normative stability is reduced, leading to the contestation of existing practices and emergence of new ones. Furthermore, if at the end of a period of relative equality among a diverse set of international actors an individual actor or small group of homogenous actors consolidate power relative to others, this new power base serves as the foundation for the enforcement of new norms. I would like to stress that even periods of relative power equality among actors in particular interaction nodes are only *relative*. As Nicholas Onuf argues, "some members of a social unit always prevail more often than others do, and they benefit more from having done so."[151] It is additionally important to keep in mind that pressure to change comes from different directions. Actors may not adhere to practices that are similar to those of other actors, and they may not want the practices of others to attain a greater cross-actor consensus that they constitute appropriate conduct.

<div align="center">Conclusion: Rethinking the Evolution of Normative Practices</div>

By describing the evolution of normative practices in an ideal-typical format, this chapter

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[151] Ibid.: 4.

presents an alternative vision of how patterns of international behaviors emerge and change over time. The ideal-typical model describes that an actor's environmental stimuli, particularly moments of environmental stress, cause that actor to critically reflect on its behavior, reorienting its performance possibility ranges regarding related behaviors. Layers of pre-existing behaviors, the justificatory discourses for them, and the linkages among them create new pathways for perceived appropriate actions, allowing for complex normative systems to be reimagined and performed in accordance to evolving standards of appropriate conduct.

At the beginning of this chapter, I rest the credibility of my model on the degree to which it is able to provide researchers with new insights, ones that previous models cannot uncover. In order to make this assessment, my ideal-typical model must serve as a lens through which to explain a narrative of complex historical events. A thorough discussion of such a historical narrative—in this case concerning US policy towards humanitarian intervention—is the task of the subsequent chapter.

In preparing readers to transition to chapter 4 it is worth highlighting how the historical narrative in chapter 4 is distinguishable from a narrative based on normative evolution model with a "norms as things" lens—more specifically, how would a historical narrative read differently if researchers use the Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle model as the ideal-type through which to uncover the peculiarities and generalities within the narrative? Figure 3.5 provides a comparative diagram of how each model envisions the evolution of norms and normative systems, respectively. On the left side is Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle model. The starting point is actor A, who comes to any new interactive setting with an internalized norm (Norm$_1$). Other actors, collectively represented *ad infinitum* as actor *n*, also populate the international system. Actors represented by actor *n* also have internalized norms that

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Figure 3.5. Norm Life Cycle Model v. Complex Normative Systems Evolution Model

The Norm Life Cycle Model

The Complex Normative Systems Evolution Model

they bring to any interactive setting. To empirically analyze the contestation of norm according to the norm life cycle model, we would therefore be forced to look at (1) the variety of discretely packaged substance-based norms brought to the interactive setting by each actor, and (2) the manner in which an actor (in the case of the diagram actor n) is able to convince, persuade, coerce, or incentivize actor A to accept Norm$_2$ in the place of Norm$_1$. In this process, arrow a and b represent the articulation of norm preferences by each actor, numeral I represents the persuasion/coercion/incentivization process, and arrow c represents the convergence of both actors towards a common norm. Researchers seeking to understand how norm entrepreneurs are able to engage with other actors to convince them of the validity or need for new norm ideas or those studying how norms tip and become increasingly horizontally adopted by actors would find this model useful in that it conceptualizes a cross-actor norm diffusion process. At the same

time, the model would limit a researcher from gaining a tremendous amount of insight from process 1, as the model does not explain the particulars of persuasion, etc. Internalization of $Norm_2$ is achieved by actor A through repetition of the behaviors associated with the substantive content of $Norm_2$.

Compare this to the diagram on the right, which represents an integrated vision of my complex normative systems evolution model. Here, the model includes only one actor. The range of practices and discourses this actor imagines to be appropriate (regarding a set of practice and justification clusters) is represented by the large box. The occurrence of an external event (numeral II) causes the actor to engage in critical self-reflection, whereby the actor "learns" from environmental experience and adjusts its performance possibility range accordingly. In this figure, the reflective actor interprets environmental stimuli in a way that causes it to constrict its performance possibilities range. Accordingly, an actor no longer conceptualizes the practice and justification cluster located within the grey subsection of the large box as appropriate or normatively justifiable. Although not shown in figure 5.1, the complex normative system evolution model would expect that after imaginative space is gained or reduced, linkages among clusters are reconceptualize so that actors' internal narratives regarding their practices remain consistent, logical, and elegant. The comparative analytical usefulness of the complex normative systems evolution model is rooted in (1) the relative strength of actors' agency to interpret events and to redraw linkages among clusters in creative ways, (2) the fact that actors' normative conceptions are the result of constant interactions with others, and the linkages among clusters allows for changes in some other issue area to permeate into issue areas relevant to an analyst's work, and (3) the complexity of overlapping and linked clusters and performance possibility ranges introduces the possibility that normative practices and their justificatory discourses are

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(co/re)produced by actors. They do not exist "out there" somewhere, but are a function of the social interactions in which actors engage. Ideas therefore have a starting place: interaction. They are not just assumed as having always been there, and this shift in assumptions is useful when analyzing *change*.

Concrete examples of how the complex normative systems evolution model uncovers taken-for-granted elements of the norm life cycle. The norm life cycle model's treatment of norms as discrete objects bound by their internal content precludes us from understand how the interaction between actor A and actor B, both entering a social space with $Norm_1$ and $Norm_2$ as background knowledge, respectively, leads a particular actor to adopt neither $Norm_1$, nor $Norm_2$, but rather a hybrid normative practice based on a reflection on past practice. That the United States, upon deciding to re-engage in humanitarian intervention efforts in Kosovo, changed its practice from a boots-on-the-ground approach to an intervention by overwhelming aerial bombardment shows that normative practices do not have the same fixed internal contents as norms do according to the "norms as things" approach. The practice of humanitarian intervention may have been rekindled, but the manner in which that intervention was conducted dramatically changed. The fact and the method are inexorably linked when we discuss normative practices, allowing us to better theorize change.

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CHAPTER 4

US INTERVENTION POLICY IN THE 1990S

This chapter provides an historical narrative regarding the practices and justificatory

discourses of the US government regarding key incidences of US humanitarian intervention (or

lack thereof) during the 1990s. On a methodological note and consistent with the Analyticist

philosophical ontological assumptions articulated in chapter 2, this chapter teases out the

relationship between case-specific empirical components and the abstractly articulated complex

normative systems evolution ideal-type. In a way, this chapter represents the overlaying of the

historical narrative over the ideal-type.

The following historical narrative begins with the civil war and humanitarian crisis in

Somalia and the decision by the George H. W. Bush administration to participate in multilateral

UN humanitarian intervention to ensure the successful delivery of food and medical aid to

Somalia. The section on Somalia will focus on the normative and discursive shifts that expanded

the United States' performance possibility range and made multilateral humanitarian intervention

an option that was consistent with other normative clusters. I then chronicle the shift in US

discourses regarding intervention after the battle of Mogadishu and the United States' refusal to

intervene in Rwanda to stop genocide.[152] In this section, I will talk at length about the shrinking

of the United States' performance possibility range on the basis of the formation of intervention

counter-discourse. As outrage at international inaction in Rwanda and Srebrenica became more

salient in the policy discourse, I describe how the pendulum swung back in the direction of

supporting humanitarian intervention efforts—albeit tactics changed dramatically as the Clinton

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[152] I focus on Rwanda, but it should be noted that non-intervention in Srebrenica constitutes a
continuation of the administration's non-interventionist stance.

administration sought to avoid US boots on the ground. Lastly, after NATO's bombings in Bosnia and Kosovo, I briefly discuss the rhetorical shift towards a practical middle ground between non-intervention and illegitimate, illegal, and/or improper intervention via the ICISS report articulating the principles of R2P.[153] The Kosovo and R2P section show that the United States' performance possibility range once again expanded, but in a different way than it did prior to the Somalia experience. The periods between events constitute the time during which normative systems evolution is most visible, as actors have time to reflect on learned experiences, to come to terms with the consequences of their actions (or inactions), and to engage with alternative discourses in a more substantive way than during events that require immediate (often not completely informed) decisions.

True to the ideal-type presented in chapter 3, I will discuss how complex layers of practices and justificatory discourses interact to produce complex normative systems as well as how these systems shift on account of actors' problem-solving strategies in response to new environmental stimuli. During each period, I will address four levels of interaction node contact relative to the US government: (1) US-up, most prominently embodied by the UN Secretariat; (2) US-across, consisting of other sovereign states; (3) US-down, referring to constituents the US government serves; and (4) US-within, constituted by individual actors within the government, which, after all, is hardly unitary. In each sub-section, my presentation will revolve around several key elements: (1) the environmental stimuli perceived by the US and the resulting expansion and contractions of its performance possibility ranges concerning practice clusters

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[153] Although this latter period could arguably extend through the Libya intervention of 2011, I will only consider the emergence of the doctrine of R2P as a conceptual tool through 2001 and briefly allude to its abridged adoption by all UN member states at the 2005 World Summit.

related to humanitarian intervention (as per figure 3.4); (2) the self-reflection process regarding normative practices in which actors engage at times of environmental stress; (3) a discussion of layers of key normative clusters, the justificatory discourses within them, and the linkages among them (as per figure 3.3); and (4) the reconstitution of complex normative systems through the evolution of clusters related to humanitarian intervention.

<u>The Somali Civil War, US Intervention, and the Battle of Mogadishu</u>

The overthrow of Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre and the onset of the Somali civil war on January 26, 1991 destabilized Somalia, leading to a power vacuum. Neither were internal power structures / political institutions strong enough to ensure continuity of government nor did the international community immediately take action to prevent the further breakdown of governance. Infighting among the once-unified anti-Barre coalition proliferated geographically. The coup d'état and civil conflict led to widespread famine and the associated deaths of an estimated 250-350,000 Somalis from starvation and disease by late-1992,[154] and threatened the further deterioration of the entire Horn of Africa.

Aid shipments entering Mogadishu were subjected to frequent assaults by warring militias despite the signing of a March 1992 ceasefire whereby "warring faction leaders… allow a UN monitoring mission into Somalia to oversee arrangements for providing humanitarian assistance."[155] Looting, as well as the diversion of humanitarian relief products to black markets,

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[154] John Norris and Bronwyn Bruton, *Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Cost of Failure in Somalia*, Washington: Center for American Progress and One Earth Future Foundation, 2011: 1; Annabel Lee Hogg, "Timeline: Somalia, 1991-2008," *The Atlantic Magazine*, 2008.

[155] "Timeline: Ambush in Mogadishu," *PBS Frontline*, 1998.

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was widespread.[156] International aid aimed at attenuating the humanitarian crisis became increasingly commandeered by warring factions and distributed among combatants or among networks of constituent supporters, whose loyalty allowed military leaders to continue their campaigns.

The overthrow of the Barre regime, endemic violence among warring factions, a widespread famine that placed in excess of a million people at risk of starvation, and widespread breakdown of social service provision created a vast humanitarian disaster. Partially in response to this confluence of crisis conditions, in April 1992 the UN authorized a humanitarian mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I), whose main objectives included the monitoring of the cease-fire among combatants in Mogadishu, the protection and security for UN personnel, and escorting the deliveries of humanitarian supplies.[157] UNOSOM I consisted of 50 unarmed military observers and 500 lightly armed infantry. In August 1992, UNOSOM I's mandate expanded to include additional peacekeepers for the protection for humanitarian relief efforts.[158] The further deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the inability of UNOSOM I's small contingent of peacekeepers to protect monitor the March 1992 ceasefire and protect humanitarian aid shipments prompted the Security Council to authorize UN member states to carry out Chapter

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[156] Paul F. Diehl, "With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 19, no. 2 (1996): 153-177.

[157] U.N. Security Council, *Security Council resolution 751 (1992) [on the situation in Somalia],* 24 April 1992, S/RES/751(1992); James Dobbins, et al., "Somalia," In *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003.

[158] U.N. Security Council, *Security Council resolution 775 (1992) [on the situation in Somalia],* 28 August 1992, S/RES/775(1992).

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VII action, effectively creating the transitional US-led United Task Force (UNITAF).[159]

UNITAF's mission included the establishment of a security zone, including guaranteeing the safety of infrastructure essential for the delivery of food aid (i.e. Mogadishu's airport and harbor), and to then transfer authority back to a more lean UN force.[160] Nearly 30,000 US troops participated in UNITAF.[161] Between December 1992 and May 1993, under the supervision of UNITAF, a number of Somalia's warring parties signed a ceasefire agreement and several important arms caches were seized from warlords.[162] In part because UNITAF's mandate only gave it authority to conduct operations to ensure the successful delivery of humanitarian assistance, the ceasefire broke and violence resumed. Nonetheless, Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst credit UNITAF, whose mandate gave it permission to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia," as having saved 100,000 lives.[163] Despite UNITAF's progress, the UN Secretary General recommended the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II by May 1993.

US troop presence in UNOSOM was reduced, and the mission was placed under non-US leadership. UNOSOM II's mandate formally entered into effect in May 1993. UNOSOM II's mission included the added objectives of disarmament of local militias, the securement of ports,

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[159] U.N. Security Council, *Security Council resolution 794 (1992) [on the situation in Somalia],* 3 December 1992, S/RES/794(1992).

[160] Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002: 46.

[161] Ibid.

[162] Diehl, 1996.

[163] Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1996): 85.

aid delivery assistance, and political, civil, and administrative reconstruction support for a reconciled Somali government. Furthermore, UNOSOM II's mandate allowed soldiers to use offensive action in order to prevent warring factions from disrupting aid networks.[164] Given its new, stronger mandate, in response to numerous armed confrontations with Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aideed (including the death of 25 Pakistani peacekeepers investigating Aideed's weapons caches) UNOSOM II forces sough to capture Aideed. UNOSOM II's focus on Aideed caused backlash among Aideed's loyalists within the tranches of the Somali population and also among other UN member states that argued the enforcement focus of the military operation was overstepping the letter of Security Council's mandate.

The manhunt for Aideed culminated on October 3-4, 1993 with an offensive assault against a Mogadishu hotel in which Aideed was believed to be hiding.[165] UNOSOM II's inability to capture Aideed, and the death of 18 US Marines during the fighting in front of news cameras that relayed the graphic images on US news outlets led to public outcry that later fundamentally shifted the Clinton administration's approach to humanitarian intervention.[166] In the immediate aftermath of the incidents, President Clinton sent additional US troops as reinforcements, but as US popular and Congressional support diminished the US made a target date for withdrawal of their troops from the UN mission for March 31 1994; the US eventually withdrew several weeks

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[164] U.N. Security Council, *Security Council resolution 814 (1993) [on the situation in Somalia],* 23 March 1932, S/RES/814(1993).

[165] Dobbins, et al., 2003: 63; Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, "Somalia," in Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (eds.), *United Nations Interventionism 1991-2004*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

[166] Dobbins, et al., 2003.

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earlier than planned.[167] I will discuss this reaction in greater detail later. President H.W. Bush's initial commitment of US troops to UNITAF and UNOSOM II, and the initial continuation of that policy by President Clinton merit discussion.

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's request that the US increase its participation in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions defined the context of the interaction between the US and the UN Secretariat. Boutros Ghali's "Agenda for Peace" recommended that: "…Member states undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council… on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis… The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response."[168] On November 30, 1992, Boutros-Ghali called on the Security Council to authorize an "international military operation, probably led by the United States, [to] intervene forcibly in Somalia to disarm its warring factions if that East African country is to be saved from further massive starvation and bloodshed."[169] On December 21, 1992, Boutros-Ghali forcefully "again called for a larger U.S. involvement in Somalia than envisioned by Washington, saying U.S. troops should fan out throughout the country to disarm warlords and gangs."[170] The message from the UN Secretariat was clear: invest more in humanitarian intervention. Among states, it is notable that Russia—

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[167] Diehl, 1996; John M. Broder, "Clinton Orders 5,300 Troops to Somalia; Vows End in 6 Months," *The Los Angeles Times*, October 8, 1993.

[168] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping," *The United Nations* (A/46/277-S/24111), 17 June 1992: 12.

[169] John M. Goshko, "U.N.'s Boutros-Ghali Propose Armed Intervention in Somalia," *The Washington Post*, December 1, 1992.

[170] "U.N. Chief to U.S.: Do More in Somalia – Boutros-Ghali Wants Gunmen Disarmed; Marines on Move," *The Seattle Times News Services*: December 22, 1992.

previously the United States' most resolute opponent among the Security Council's permanent members—and China—traditionally opposed to actions violating states' sovereignty—both voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 794, authorizing the Operation Restore Hope. The resolution passed the Security Council unanimously.[171] Furthermore, "China supported all Security Council resolutions on Somalia between January 1992 and November 1994, despite the fact that those resolutions dealt with the purely internal humanitarian situation in Somalia."[172] Then-Russian Ambassador to the UN Sergey Lavrov later argued: "Russia attaches great importance in acquiring the practical skills of cooperation with other states' contingents in peacekeeping. Towards this end, successful joint military drills were carried out with French peacekeepers and two joint exercises were staged with relevant US units."[173]

The Bush administration's decision to intervene in Somalia was contextually positioned among four salient experiences from which the administration learned how to interpret its perceived environment. These four experiences each contributed to an expansion of the United States' perceived performance possibility range regarding humanitarian intervention. First, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the revolutions against Eastern European communism gave the US government a perception of American supremacy after the end of the Cold War. The profoundness of the United States' "victory" in the Cold War cannot be understated as a moment of learning. Second, the fall of Eastern European and Soviet

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[171] U.N. Security Council, *Security Council resolution 794*, 1992.

[172] Jonathan E. Davis, "From Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 44, no. 2 (2011): 217-283.

[173] Sergey Lavrov, "The Russian View of Peacekeeping: International Activity for Peace," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* III, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1996): 23-33.

communism taught the Bush administration optimism. Existential rivalries had seemingly given way to a "new world order" predicated on rule of law, multilateralism, and increased international cooperation. This new optimism was strengthened by the third factor: the United States' success in leveraging multi-national support for the Gulf War, which itself was considered a dramatic success. Jim Mann argues that the "offer to send up to 30,000 American troops to Somalia represents what is likely to be the Bush Administration's final attempt to define the idea of a 'new world order.'"[174] Lastly, the uptick in internal ethno-political armed conflict[175] embodied by relatively newly igniting conflicts in the former Yugoslavia,[176] Rwanda,[177] Sierra Leone and Liberia,[178] Algeria,[179] Afghanistan,[180] and Transnistria,[181] and the ongoing civil

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[174] Jim Mann, "News Analysis: Somalia Closing Out Bush's 'New World Order,'" *Los Angeles Times*, November 29, 1992.

[175] *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*, (Published for the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia) New York: Oxford University Press, 2005; cf. Peter Wallensteen, and Margareta Sollenberg, "The End of International War? Armed Conflict 1989-95," *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 3 (1996): 353-370.

[176] Norman M. Naimark, and Holly Case (eds.), *Yugoslavia and its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003; Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences*, New York: New York University Press, 1995; Gale Stokes, John Lampe, Dennison Rusinow, and Julie Mostov, "Instant History: Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession," *Slavic Review* 55, no. 1 (1996): 136-160.

[177] Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; Paul J. Magnarella, "The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda," *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 3, no. 4 (2005): 801-822.

[178] John L. Hirsch, "War in Sierra Leone," *Survival* 43, no. 3 (2001): 145-162; Mark Huband, *The Liberian Civil War*, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998.

[179] Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War: 1990-1998*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000; Miriam R. Lowi, "Algeria, 1992-2002: Anatomy of a Civil War," In Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, *Understanding Civil War (Volume 1: Africa): Evidence and Analysis*. Washington: The World Bank, 2005: 221-246.

conflicts (at the time) in Sudan, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Colombia, Kurd-majority areas in multiple countries, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Angola, etc.[182] provided the Bush administration with a plethora of new challenges that seemed disconnected relative to the visibly structural configuration of Cold War enmity. The United States' perception of global challenges and definition of allies and enemies was, on one hand, eased by the elimination of the Soviet Union as an existential rival, and, on the other hand, complicated by the "discovery" of multiple threats seemingly lacking a common origin or any sort of ideological, political, geographic, or other identifiable source of cohesion. The new international system appeared more safe from the perspective of grand strategy always mindful of the possibility of nuclear war; the new system also appeared much more precarious when taking into account other types of threats, which during the Cold War were downplayed relative to US-Soviet military and economic competitiveness.

What did the Bush administration learn from the aforementioned events? First, that humanitarian intervention was becoming increasingly demanded given the multiplicity of violent conflicts proliferating throughout the developing world. Second, the US could help meet the demand for humanitarian action through multilateral engagement and working via international organizations, as it had so successfully done to push Iraq out of Kuwait. Third, that because of its

[180] Olivier Roy, *Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War*, Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan in 1994: Civil War and Disintegration," *Asian Survey* 35, no. 2 (1995): 147-152.

[181] Pål Kolstø, Andrei Edemsky, and Natalya Kalashnikova, "The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism," *Europe & Asia Studies* 45, no. 6 (1993): 973-1000.

[182] For a partial list, see Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," World Bank Policy Research Working Papers (November 1999): 1-50; for a more complete dataset, see Nils Petter Gleditsch, et al. *The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4 – 2008*, Oslo: International Peace Research Institution (PRIO), 2008.

new-found sole superpower status the US *could* (and, because other states did not possess such great capabilities, *should*) take a leading role in any multilateral humanitarian effort. And fourth, that by taking a leading role in multilateral humanitarian efforts, the United States could build on its gains (won through the fall of the Eastern bloc) and ensure that the "new world order" reflected its status as global hegemon. Whereas during the Cold War multilateral humanitarian intervention was relatively unimaginable given US/USSR rivalry and the resulting stalemate in the UN Security Council, the new post-Cold War global political environment created space for reimagining the United States' role as a humanitarian actor.

Normative practices are—by definition—constantly negotiated, (re)constructed, and thus in a state of potential flux. I therefore choose to conceptualize normative stability in relative terms. A few elements of the normative context in early 1992 are relatively visible. First, the norm of non-intervention based on sovereignty was impacted by the Gulf War. On one hand, the international coalition that repelled Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait had the limited objective of restoring the sovereignty of Kuwait. The coalition also did not seek to forcibly remove Hussein from power, although the Bush administration did encourage armed rebellion within Iraq. On the other hand, others argue that the protection of Kuwait provided a pretext to interfere in the Middle East in a way that violated the sovereignty of nations. Second, intervention based on humanitarian principles seemed to be gaining traction, particularly as the scourge of civil conflict was becoming more visible relative to inter-state wars. A number of prominent domestic and international NGOs strongly argued for increased humanitarian aid and intervention, particularly in visible conflicts such as the Yugoslav wars of secession (particularly as the situation in Bosnia deteriorated) and Somalia. The narrative of "moral responsibility" and "duty" gained some ground before the United States' involvement in battle of Mogadishu. With

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the fall of Eastern communism, the normative trends of market-liberalization and the protection of human rights were also strengthened. As economic prosperity, human rights, and humanitarianism became increasingly intertwined in public discourse, the momentum for interventionist US foreign policy increased.

An important narrative—that individuals in need of humanitarian aid and protection are not American or not "like Americans," and thus should not be taken into account when the US pursues its conceptualization of its own strategic interests—was present and latent prior to the Somalia decision-making process. Several interactions made humanitarian intervention, even when not in the direct strategic interest of the US, the policy that "won" during the Bush administration's decision-making regarding Somalia. First, public opinion—which sets the tone for interactions between the administration and the public, and between the administration and Congress—regarding intervention in Somalia was moderate but sufficiently favorable to not cause the administration alarm at the onset.[183] Retrospective analysis shows that "the American public [was] supportive (or at least tolerant) of a post-Cold War peace operation-even when the overall policy objective involves more expansive peace-enforcement goals—so long as American soldiers are not losing their lives in the pursuit of interests not considered to be vital."[184] Second, actors within the US government itself forged a cautious agreement that intervention was necessary to ease suffering. The Defense Department was particularly opposed to intervention: "Powell had been instrumental in shifting the Pentagon's position on this issue,

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[183] Matthew A. Baum, "How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2004): 187-226.

[184] Louis J. Klarevas, "Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 64, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 528.

although he had only reluctantly come to believe in the necessity of intervention."[185] Although then-Secretary of Defense Cheney and National Security Advisor Scowcroft had reservations about US involvement,[186] they publicly repudiated opponents of the intervention once Bush decided to contribute US troops.[187]

The Bush administration's balancing of policy makers' and public opinions led it to choose intervention. The administration's decision is influenced by two other factors. First, the Gulf War constituted proof that multilateral intervention could succeed and actually shift public opinion in its favor *post facto*. Second, and more importantly, the Bush administration decided to commit US troops in Somalia one month after loosing a general election and one month prior to vacating office—public opinion had become largely irrelevant to the administration, and it was free to engage in policy that it constructed as "right." Only after the battle of Mogadishu, well into Clinton's term –who was more bound to public opinion—did internal governmental as well as public opinion shift decidedly against humanitarian intervention. And only then did geospatial othering become a more explicit, frequent, and salient part of the discourse regarding US foreign policy interests.

A more in-depth look at President George H. W. Bush's speech on Somalia helps underscore the possibilities envisioned in the new post-Cold War environment.[188] The first

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[185] Robert F. Baumann, Laurence A. Yates, Versalle F. Washington, *"My Clan Against the World:" US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994*, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003.

[186] Ibid.

[187] Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia*, Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1995.

[188] Bush, 1992.

paragraph of the speech begins with a depiction of the scale of the famine in Somalia. Bush even compares the number of fatalities that had already been attributed to the famine with the population of a US city. In the second and third paragraphs, Bush presents a picture of United States' (substantial, but relatively limited compared to the engagement for which he later advocates) involvement up to that point, and discusses the failure of limited humanitarian aid endeavors. In his fourth and fifth paragraphs Bush describes the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and the tragedy of food aid being denied to the starving masses. The story so far has a single purpose: to lead to the phrase, "It's now clear that military support is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need to survive."[189]

In the next paragraph Bush frames the UN as having (seemingly almost desperately) begged the US to be involved, and America valiantly answering the call. This superhero paradigm is consistent with some variants of sole superpower mentality.[190] On the other hand, being a "global-police officer"—as detractors derisively termed US interventionist policy—and working multilaterally seems to be internally at odds insofar as one might question the agency of non-superpower states in the decision making process. The degree to which a secondary actor has the capacity to deviate from the will of the superpower, and its dominance through international institutions (or more abstractly, interactive nodes) is disputed.[191] This is particularly

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[189] Ibid.

[190] Although dissention in Congress, in this case coming from then-Senator Joseph Biden, shows that the recognition superpower status did not necessarily create super-hero mentality: "You can be the world superpower and still be unable to maintain peace throughout the world." See Barton Gellman, "Keeping the U.S. First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower," *The Washington Post*, March 11, 1992.

[191] Stanley Meisler, "Diplomacy: Adjusting to a Unipolar World: Developing Countries are Worried About a Loss of Leverage in International Politics in the Wake of America's Gulf War Victory," *The Los Angeles Times*, April 5, 1991.

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the case if, as G. John Ikenberry argues, the US has built a liberal institutional order that serves its interests,[192] and one should recall that states with less material and physical power have less of an ability to simply bypass international forums in which the US might dominate (i.e. the UN Security Council).

After praising American military personnel, Bush returns to making the case for *humanitarian* intervention: "The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act."[193] The narrative of righting wrongs and helping people in need is a new justificatory discourse, but is significantly juxtaposed to Bush's next paragraph wherein he acknowledges:

> "I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs. But we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death."[194]

This quote highlights the relative instability of the new conceptualization of possible practices of multilateral intervention. On one hand it is a grave moral wrong to allow the sort of suffering Bush describes in Somalia to continue. On the other hand, other circumstances (Bosnia comes to mind as a concurrent, worsening crisis demanding humanitarian attention, and not getting it) are considered beyond the capabilities, reach, and interest (broadly defined) of the US. How does an interventionist US administration decide which humanitarian missions are worthwhile and which

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[192] G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

[193] Bush, 1992.

[194] Ibid.

are not? The lack of clarity on this issue constitutes the aforementioned instability within the justificatory discourse regarding US superpower capability regarding humanitarian action.

Bush shifts to a discussion of multilateralism: that the US will not be working alone, that partnering states will provide key support, and that the US will hand back operational command the UN after the on-the-ground situation has been stabilized. With a few declarative statements of optimism and empathy (that the US will succeed, that outlaws beware, and that, as Commander-in-Chief, Bush will bring troops back home as soon as possible) the speech ends but for one curious remark: "To the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence. Based on my conversations with other coalition leaders, I can state with confidence: We come to your country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed."[195] Bush's attempt to reconcile the principle of non-intervention based on sovereignty and intervention based on humanitarian duty to help (in the context of my ideal-type this is congruent with the notion of grafting ideas from practice and justification clusters onto emerging ones) results in a narrative that both could occur concurrently insofar as the intervening force simply stays away from political issues. Mission success in Somalia was wholly dependent on the willingness of the intervening force to become partial, to militarily engage political-militant factions, and to build networks of allies on the ground as a prerequisite to maintaining long-term security. This also *sets up the conditions for experiencing a performance possibility range constriction*: when US intervention was challenged because it appeared as though the US was taking sides in a political conflict that was not its own battle to fight—and this is precisely how the issue was framed by opponents to intervention after the battle of Mogadishu.

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[195] Ibid.

Non-Intervention, National Interests, Othering, and Rwanda

After the battle of Mogadishu "everything changed." The Somalia experience became *the* most salient learning experience to which the Clinton administration could point and argue that humanitarian intervention for its own sake is dangerous. The Somalia experience was so traumatic that its effects earned a nickname: Somalia syndrome. "The noticeable absence of any Western military in [a number of later UN operations] underscored the strong U.S. preference to avoid situations that might lead U.S. troops into 'another Somalia.'"[196] In a December 7-9, 1992 CBS/New York Times poll, 73% of Americans approved of Clinton's handling of the situation in Somalia (and only 19% disapproved) but by October 21, 1993 the administration's approval rate regarding Somalia was only 29%, while 63% disapproved.[197] The large-scale shift in public opinion indicates that the Somalia experience was perceived by the US public as overwhelmingly negative and caused the administration a public relations nightmare that required reconciling through reflection on peacekeeping policy.

On February 15, 1993, the Clinton administration ordered an inter-agency review of multilateral peacekeeping operations through Presidential Review Direction 13 (PRD-13).[198] PRD-13 represents a clearly visible and institutionalized period of self-reflection. During the yearlong review process, the various agencies tasked with providing advisory opinions and

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[196] Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, with Christina Briggs and Anja Miller, "Managing the Pentagon's International Relations," In Ashton B. Carter and John P. White (Eds.), *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future*, Cambridge: Preventive Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and the Harvard Kennedy School, 2000.

[197] Klarevas, 2000: 532-533.

[198] "Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13): Multinational Peacekeeping Operations," *The White House and the US National Security Council*, February 15, 1993.

policy recommendations regarding multilateral peacekeeping operations were nearly all psychologically impacted by the outcome of the battle of Mogadishu; this is evident in the subtext of the PRD-13 document and the resulting PDD-25 summary document. PRD-13 sets up a number of the review objectives by leading with negative language: i.e. "To what extent are nations becoming dependent upon the UN peacekeeping to solve internal problems that they could or should be solving themselves?"[199] Asking agencies to review public opinion regarding US participation in multilateral peacekeeping, only months after the Somalia incident, nearly guaranteed the outcome of the findings.[200] Furthermore, agencies were asked to "identify the shortcomings of the current United Nations conventional peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief system and propose options for improvements"[201] without consideration of UN peacekeeping and relief successes. The presumption of the review directive was that the UN was struggling to attain competence in peacekeeping operations management.

What did the Clinton administration learn from Somalia? First, that military engagement with armed factions fighting a civil war was not the place of the United States military, even if humanitarian crises existed. And second, no humanitarian crisis in the context of armed conflict could, on its own, be sufficiently grave as to warrant US boots on the ground. Only strategic interest could override US antipathy towards getting involved in another country's internal "quagmire." The narrative of irrelevancy—the notion that civil conflicts elsewhere were not of

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[199] Ibid.: 2.

[200] Ibid. PRD-13 demands that agencies consider "What are the public/legislative attitudes towards peacekeeping (multilateral and unilateral) within key foreign states and the United States?"

[201] Ibid.: 3. Similarly, the document asks "what are the deficiencies of UN logistics and lift systems…?"

concern to the US unless they affected vital interests (the procurement of key resources, the targeting of Americans in the conflict zone, the escalation of conflict to include a strategic US ally, etc.)—was sustained by a retreat from the "new world order" in the direction of *othering* (which I will discuss momentarily).

The Rwandan civil war, which began in October 1990, was about to be concluded by the Arusha Accords between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan government. The shooting down of the Rwandan President's airplane upon return from Arusha marked the beginning of the genocidal slaughter of the minority Tutsis, although explicit signs of buildup are irrefutable. The presence of the international press and of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda seriously calls into question the idea that the international community simply did not know enough about what was taking place. Unclassified documents indicate that intelligence gathering efforts by US allies—most prominently, France[202]—had gathered sufficient information regarding the nature of the situation in Rwanda that intervention could have been given a strong moral justification. The genocide in Rwanda began on Wednesday, April 6, 1994. As early as February of the previous year it is alleged that, "France's foreign intelligence service, *Direction generale de la securite exterieure*, called a rash of mass murders in Rwanda "ethnic massacres" and warned they might be part of "a vast program of ethnic cleansing against the Tutsis… France's ambassador had warned Rwandan officials would like "to proceed to a systematic genocide."[203]

On January 11, 1994, three months prior to the mass killing began, United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) Commander Romeo Dallaire cabled UN Headquarters in New York seeking approval to raid a reported arms depot. Dallaire argues in

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[202] "France Implicated in Rwandan Genocide," *National Post*, July 7, 2007.

[203] Ibid.

favor of this option in light of his assessment that "violence could take place day of the [Arusha Accords] ceremonies or the day after."[204] Dallaire's requests, in this now infamous "genocide memo," were superseded by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. The Dallaire memorandum highlights that questions about Rwanda's stability were raised before the genocide began, and that actionable intelligence existed early on enough to have perhaps actually prevented some of the killing. If, for instance, Dallaire had been given authorization to raid the weapons depot, it is possible that (1) those particular weapons would have been secured and taken out of the hands of Hutu *genocidaires*, and (2) such action might have demonstrated willingness on the part of the UN to act to prevent genocide, perhaps acting as a deterrent for otherwise future perpetrators.

On April 11, as the US and other Western countries prepared to evacuate their nationals from Rwanda, the New York Times wrote, "Since Wednesday, it is estimated that more than 20,000 people have been killed in fighting between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority."[205] On April 21, Rwandan human rights activist Monique Mujawamariya penned a letter to President Clinton in which she explicitly stated, "[Extremist Hut United States'] campaign is genocide against the Tutsis."[206] On April 23 the New York Times published an opinion piece that stated: "What looks very much like genocide has been taking place in Rwanda. People are

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[204] Romeo Dallaire, "Request for Protection for Informant," *Facsimile from Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to Maj. Gen. Maurice Baril, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations*, January 11, 1994.

[205] Donatella Lorch, "Strife in Rwanda: Evacuation; American Evacuees Describe Horror Faced by Rwandans," *The New York Times*, April 11, 1994.

[206] "National Security Archive Document 47 Mujawamariya Letter for the President," April 21, 1994.

pulled from cars and buses, ordered to show their identity papers and then killed on the spot if they belong to the wrong ethnic group. Thousands of bodies have already piled up, and the killing continues."[207]

By April 26, less than three weeks after the start of the genocide, an memorandum from the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) stated, "The ICRC delegate for Africa is certain at least 100,000 Rwandans have been killed since April 6, believes the actual number is closer to 300,000, and notes ICRC personnel in country think the tool could be 500,000," and goes on to state, "Hutu extremists… speak of a "final solution" to eliminate all Tutsis."[208] This information is reinforced in a CIA National Intelligence Daily circulated on the same day, which further describes approximately 450,000 internally displaced people seeking to flee Rwanda.[209]

The cover of the week of May 16 edition of Time Magazine depicted a Rwandan mother and her child with the quote, "'There are no devils left in hell,' the missionary said, 'they are all in Rwanda.'"[210] On May 23, Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) authored a letter to the editor of the New York Times stating, "Within five weeks at least 200,000 Rwandans have been killed, half a

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[207] "Cold Choices in Rwanda," *The New York Times*, April 23, 1994.

[208] "National Security Archive Document 23 Secretary's Morning Summary (SMS)," *State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research*, April 26, 1994. It is noteworthy that SMSs are "*highly-classified, newsletter format report[s] produced six days of the week featuring the top intelligence* 'stories' each morning for the Secretary, his assistant secretaries and other senior Executive Branch officials, such as National Security Advisor Anthony Lake." Retrieved from the National Security Archive and attributed to Walter Pincus, "PDB, the Only News Not Fit for Anyone Else to Read", *The Washington Post*, August 27, 1994. Emphasis added.

[209] "National Security Archive Document 35 National Intelligence Daily," *Central Intelligence Agency*, April 26, 1994.

[210] Nancy Gibbs, "Why? The Killing Fields of Rwanda," *Time*, May 16, 1994.

million more are now refugees, and there are hundreds of thousands of displaced people… our expatriate workers have had to stand helplessly by and watch… More than 4,000 Rwandans flee the country every day."[211] MSF adds that "we have known for a month what is going on."[212] The same month, African Rights released a comprehensive 55-page report detailing the situation in Rwanda, the actors, the means used to carry out the genocide, and efforts to conceal crimes.[213] Power summarizes that although media coverage of Rwanda was not heavy, "it was steady."[214]

Interestingly, to paint a clear picture of the events on the ground in Rwanda between April and June of 1994, I only cited two sources that were not contemporaneous. It is also noteworthy that credible nongovernmental humanitarian relief organizations such as MSF and the ICRC were not only reporting the facts on the grounds for the sake of objective knowledge-production. They had an agenda: to elicit a response from governments around the world to put an end to the killing. The above-demonstrated abundance of knowledge about the events taking place on the ground in Rwanda ought to have caused the US government to consider a wide range of policy options. Unclassified documents summarize a number of options that were considered, but it is clear from these documents that the most decisive among these options were seemingly quickly rejected with little debate. Although it is difficult to say with certainty what other policy options the US considered due to the possible existence of additional classified

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[211] Alain Destexhe, "Rwandans Die as the U.N. Procrastinates," *The New York Times*, May 23, 1994.

[212] Ibid.

[213] Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, "Rwanda: Who is Killing; Who is Dying; What is to be Done: A Discussion Paper," *African Rights*, May 1994.

[214] Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide*, Harper Perennial, 2002: 375.

documents, available evidence also suggests a great number of potential policies were not even considered in a meaningful way including the possibility of a boots-on-the-ground, Somalia-style multilateral humanitarian intervention.

Although with perfect hindsight it is easier to make this claim, a wide array of US possible policy *options* could have included at least the following options: (1) supporting a continuation of UNAMIR's mandate at full capacity prior to the start of the genocide—that is, essentially preserving the *status quo ante*; (2) advocating for an increase in UNAMIR's capacity given the scale of violence; (3) committing US troops and/or civilian personnel; (4) engaging with allies and states neighboring Rwanda to increase the robustness of a multinational observation and peacekeeping force; (5) agreeing to the Belgian withdrawal, but maintaining UNAMIR's mandate intact; (6) expand UNAMIR's mandate to include protecting civilians without increasing the mission's operational capacity; or (7) advocating for UNAMIR's termination. Other formulations might have been developed through careful considerations of alternatives. There is little in the unclassified documents, however, that suggests the US government thoroughly deliberated whether to support the withdrawal of Belgian peacekeepers from UNAMIR, or its position to seek the termination of UNAMIR's mandate.[215] In fact, the termination of UNAMIR became a talking point for State Department officials within one week of the start of the genocide.

On May 1, 1994 a secret Department of Defense memorandum listed a number of concrete policies for Rwanda. With respect to each item, the memo concluded the decision of the US government at the time was to caution against the use of the term "genocide" to describe the

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[215] "National Security Archive Document 16 Bennet Memo to Secretary," *State Department*, April 13, 1994.

events in Rwanda out of concern that doing so would "commit [the US government] to *actually do something,*" refused to authorize UMAMIR to protect Rwandan civilians, sought an arms embargo on all parties to the conflict (including the Rwandan Patriotic Front—or, RPF—who were fighting against the principal perpetrators of the genocide), displaced the responsibility of countering genocidal propaganda on Rwanda's neighbors, and argued against pressuring perpetrators of genocide through threats of post-facto penal action.[216] The (re)establishment of peace in Rwanda was considered by the State Department a precondition for US engagement in Rwanda.[217] A memorandum dated several days later cites National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's desire to jam RTLM radio in order to stop the dissemination of kill lists and hate propaganda. The Department of Defense concluded, however, that airborne and ground-based jamming is "an ineffective and expensive mechanism" and that "international legal conventions complicate" such actions.[218] The full breadth of options the Department of Defense considered with respect to jamming, or the depth to which such analysis was conducted, is not articulated in unclassified documents.

In terms of policy options unrelated to UN peacekeeping as well, it is important to consider the alternatives. The US could have either pursued unilateral action or could have engaged other states (including at the UN) to create a more robust international force modeled

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[216] "Discussion Paper," *Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region*, May 1, 1994. Emphasis added.

[217] "Talking Points On Rwanda/Burundi," *Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa, through Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*, April 11, 1994.

[218] "Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts," *Memorandum from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, National Security Council*, May 5, 1994.

after UNITAF—a force capable of military operations aimed at ending the genocide, and whose mandate could include the protection of civilians. In addition to jamming RTLM radio, the US government could have: (1) placed US troops as peacekeepers on the ground in Rwanda (recall variations of this point above); (2) financially and/or logistically sponsored other countries' peacekeeping efforts—especially among countries who might have been willing to send troops but that lacked the financial or logistical means to do so; (3) arm the RPF in an effort to hasten the end of the genocide through an RPF military victory (which is what ended up occurring later without US support); (4) threaten to prosecute the perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity; or (5) seek to eliminate the genocidal Rwandan government's authority to represent the Rwandan state at the UN. Indeed, some of these options may very well have proven tremendously expensive or hazardous to US personnel, but they merited fair consideration nonetheless. This list of possible alternative policies is by no means exhaustive (or even terribly creative). According to Samantha Power, President Clinton "did not convene a single meeting of his senior foreign policy advisors to discuss U.S. options for Rwanda."[219]

The decision to not intervene in Rwanda was pre-made, but it was not made in a vacuum. Michael Barnett convincingly narrates that the UN Secretariat and its supporting bureaucracy were not interested in pushing the Rwanda issue to the Security Council because of fears that a botched intervention resembling Somalia would further undermine UN legitimacy and would endanger the gains the UN had made over the last half-century.[220] Interactions among the US and the UN leadership were marked by mutual interest in avoiding a repeat of Mogadishu.

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[219] Power, 2002: 335.

[220] See Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Michael Barnett, "The UN Security Council, Indifference and Genocide in Rwanda," *Cultural Anthropology* 12, no. 4 (1997): 551-578.

Furthermore, US desire to not intervene was given a legitimating push when the government of Belgium requested that the US advocate for drawing down UNAMIR's mandate after the death of Belgian peacekeepers at the hands of the Interahamwe in Kigali.[221]

This was made most visible by the infamous guidance given to diplomatic and press relations personnel to use the term "acts of genocide" rather than "genocide," and to discuss "political efforts" rather than "attempts" at peace. These facts are evidence that the (1) the Clinton administration had reached a concrete decision to not intervene in Rwanda prior to having any serious debate on the matter, and (2) the administration's goal was to consolidate its public message to prevent the development of viable discursive justifications for action.[222] The Clinton administration's imaginative brick wall shift dramatically so to preclude interventionist practices from being considered appropriate or discursively justifiable. The story of the United States' lack of serious consideration of broad interventionist practices and discourse, and their applicability to the unfolding situation in Rwanda and later in Srebrenica, constitutes evidence of a significant atrophy of the administration's performance possibility range.

Discourse justifying non-intervention in Rwanda is remarkably poignant. PDD-25 simultaneously invoked that participating in UN peacekeeping operations could enhance US "national interest," but that US "national interest" had to be clearly visible when decide whether to participate in particular interventions.[223] PDD-25's timing—at the height of the Rwandan genocide—clearly concurrently (1) applied the directive directly to US policy towards Rwanda

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[221] Power, 2002.

[222] "Discussion Paper," *Department of Defense,* 1994.

[223] "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (Presidential Decision Directive 25)," *The White House*, May 6, 1994.

and (2) justified inaction in Rwanda given its periphery with respect to US strategic, military, and economic interests.

Furthermore, what might have otherwise been widespread revulsion to the deaths in Rwanda, was muted partially as a result of the conceptualization that Rwanda (and Africa in general) is a "distant land [that] had not captivated" US decision makers and thus US lives were too valuable to risk thereon.[224] According to Power, a US officer told Romeo Dallaire that "[the US is] doing calculations back here, and one American casualty is worth about 85,000 Rwandan dead."[225] As Rwanda unraveled, the Clinton Administration's former special envoy to Somalia issued a warning to developing countries that many among them would have to face their own challenges and that, "the international community is not disposed to deploying 20, 40, 60,000 military forces each time there is an internal crisis in a failed state."[226] A 1994 National Security Strategy report released by the White House reflected back to the Somalia and Rwanda decisions and concluded that, "efforts by the U.S… must be limited in duration and designed to give the peoples of a nation the means and opportunity to put their own house in order… the responsibility for the fate of a nation rests finally with its own people."[227] The crass otherization of Rwandans as inferior and therefore not worthy of an expenditure of US blood, treasure, or even attention set the tone for the broader discourse on the causes of the Rwandan conflict.

Conflict intractability on account of primordial "ancient hatreds" or Huntingtonian

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[224] Ibid.: 509.

[225] Ibid.: 381.

[226] Elaine Sciolino, "For West, Rwanda Is Not Worth the Political Candle," *The New York Times*, April 15, 1994.

[227] "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," *The White House*, July 1994.

"clashes of civilizations"[228] feature prominently in the discourse on civil conflict that followed the US withdrawal from UNOSOM II. This rhetoric was employed regarding intervention in Bosnia: "As one Serb soldier mused: My uncle fought against Croats and Muslims in World War II. Now 50 years later I travel the same road, fighting the same people. And if the world forces us to join Croats and Muslims in a federation, our children will also travel this road, fighting another war."[229] Only 6 days after the killings in Rwanda began the narrative of ancient hatreds was applied there: "[Relief workers] provided refuge and comfort to frightened Rwandan friends desperate to escape the blood lust and *ancient ethnic hatreds that have once more inflamed Rwanda*."[230] Donatella Lorch argued, "…more than 20,000 people have been killed in fighting between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority *that have struggled for dominance since Rwanda won independence from Belgium in 1962*."[231]

The narrative of ancient hatreds was so strong that even authors who questioned its application to Rwanda did so not because they found it inappropriate to apply in that context, but because they found it inappropriate to not apply it to other contexts beyond Rwanda as well: "What has happened in Burundi and Rwanda may reinforce a widely held view in the West that democratic roots simply will not sprout in some African countries, which are often seen as hybrid political creations throwing together tribes and cultures whose only common heritage, unless held in check by a brutal dictatorship, is warfare against one another. *There may be some*

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[228] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* (1993): 22-49.

[229] Barbara Conry, "The Futility of U.S. Intervention in Regional Conflicts" (Cato Policy Analysis No. 209), Washington, DC: *The Cato Institute*, May 19, 1994.

[230] William E. Schmidt, "Refugee Missionaries From Rwanda Speak of Their Terror, Grief and Guilt," *The New York Times*, April 12, 1994. Emphasis added.

[231] Lorch, 1994. Emphasis added.

truth to this view—but it does not apply only to Africa."[232] Robert Kaplan's widely distributed piece, "The Coming Anarchy"—which articulated a view that the end of the Cold War, coupled with resources scarcity in developing states, would usher in an era of state failure and the rise of criminalistic warlords—popularized the notion that conflicts in Africa, and elsewhere, could destabilize the United States proper.[233] These accounts depended on the depiction of the Rwandan, the African, the abstract (but non-white, or in the case of Bosnia, the non-Christian) other as lesser, more (indeed, almost criminally or pathologically) violent, and constantly in a state warfare. The notion that ancient hatreds constituted the root of these conflicts suggests that the parties to the conflict lacked the opportunity—or even ability—to move beyond a temporally earlier state of social interaction. They were unable to overcome their fixation on some ancient—implicitly simultaneously impossible to mediate due to the complexity of conflicting claims, and trivial or childish (relative to modern) considerations—disputes. The Rwandan conflict was even easier to temporally distance on account of Rwanda's geospatial distance from the U.S. and Europe. US government narratives regarding the distance of Rwanda and the primordialism of the ethnic conflict underlying the genocide were reinforced by similar depictions in the media.

The narrative regarding US national interest is perhaps even more telling. On May 18, the New York Times reported, "The officials made clear that the United States remains unwilling to provide more than logistical support to any United Nations rescue mission for Rwanda… in

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[232] Clifton R. Wharton Jr., "The Nightmare in Central Africa," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1994.

[233] Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994: 44-76.

which the United States has no *real* national interests."[234] It is unclear what the US government's "real" interests were with respect to intervention (and these are certainly not clearly articulated in PDD-25), but one thing is certain: Rwanda did not reach the invisible threshold. "[US] national interests include our cherishing of peace and the diminution of torture and aggression around the world. We cannot always bring these interests to fruition, especially where overriding strategic interests are not at stake."[235] Henry Bienen further argues that saving Rwandan lives—on account of being merely a peripheral interest of the US—could only be undertaken in a universe without resource scarcity: "We need not be and cannot be consistent in our response to ethnic violence. Our economic and military resources are not sufficient for us to be the world's policeman."[236] (This mirrors a statement made by Secretary of Defense William Perry in June 1994, that, "[The Bosnia] conflict did involve U.S. national interests, humanitarian and otherwise, but not "supreme" interests."[237])

Iver Neumann argues that: (1) "discourse is written for someone"; and (2) a certain discourse is a distillation of previous, combined versions, interacting through a process of intertextual development.[238] The "someone" for whom this discourse was circulated was two-fold. On one hand, it targeted a public that wanted neither intervention, nor a guilty conscience.

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[234] Douglas Jehl, "U.S. is Showing a New Caution on U.N. Peacekeeping Missions," *The New York Times*, May 18, 1994.

[235] Henry S. Bienen, "The Morality of Selective Intervention: Foreign policy: We Should Act Only Where We Can Assist a Positive Outcome—In Bosnia, Say, but Not in Rwanda," *The Los Angeles Times*, June 22, 1994.

[236] Ibid.

[237] "Biography of William J. Perry," *Department of Defense*. Retrieved from: http://www.defense.gov/specials/secdef_histories/bios/perry.htm.

[238] Neumann, 2008: 64; Hansen, 2006: 56-59.

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On the other hand, it constituted an internal narrative of justification of humanitarian practices—namely, complete non-intervention—that resulted from the constricting of the United States' performance possibilities range after the battle of Mogadishu. The discourses of geo-spatial and temporal othering of the Rwandan people was a discursive technique through which actor's justified to themselves and to others the manner in which their practice and justification clusters related to non-intervention related to other clusters salient at the time.

We might imagine that an alternative political context might have led to divergent outcomes even as actors operating in this counterfactual universe would have undergone a period of critical self-reflection after the battle of Mogadishu. If, for instance, Bush had had a second term, it is possible that the administration's heightened commitment to the idea of the "New World Order" might have allowed the US to evaluate the battle of Mogadishu differently. Instead of a constriction of imagined policy possibilities, an counterfactual reality might have included a less dramatic reassessment of a particular site of engagement, rather than an overhaul of US humanitarian intervention policy altogether. Similarly compelling, had civil conflicts not been consistently ignored during the Cold War, the conflict of the early 1990s might not have registered to the US and other global powers as an "uptick," making it possible to circumvent the racist discourse of ancient hatreds and barbarism that directly justified US inaction in Rwanda.

Bosnia, Dayton, Modifying Intervention Tactics, and Kosovo

Clinton had argued, when he was a presidential candidate, "on several occasions for an American policy that would stop atrocities committed by the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs".[239] Upon winning the 1992 presidential election, Hansen chronicles that Clinton's engagement with

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[239] Hansen, 2006: 136.

the discourse on Bosnia wavered as he on one hand invoked the genocide discourse which suggested that intervention would be a key policy of the US, but on the other hand he invoked the discourse of ancient hatreds, whose policy prescription precluded US entanglement.[240] After the public relations nightmare that ensued for the administration after the battle of Mogadishu, the discourse of ancient hatreds was employed to justify non-intervention—much as we saw was the case with Rwanda in the previous section. It took allowing over 800,000 Rwandans to be slaughtered while the world was watching, and for 8,000 Bosnian men and boys to be murdered in a "UN safe area" in Srebrenica to call into question the moral authority of the US (and the international community writ large) and to shift justificatory discourse back to a discourse of genocide. The failure of UN peacekeepers to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica and the collapse of a number of areas designated "safe" according to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which had been developed in 1993, provided NATO with new justificatory discourse for stepping up interventionist engagement in Bosnia.

Although NATO, with the expressed support of the Clinton administration, had been conducting limited aerial bombings of Bosnian Serb targets since April 1994. These limited engagements in Bosnia did little to change the calculus of Bosnian Serb forces or the Serbian government in Belgrade. Hansen describes that it was not until a month and a half after "the reports from Srebrenica and the fall of another safe area, Zepa, fortified Western resolve…" that, "UNPROFOR and NATO commanders agreed that the conditions for commencing air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions were met" with more resolute force.[241] During the ensuing Operation Deliberate Force, NATO "flew around 3,500 sorties, hitting more than 60 targets

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[240] Ibid.: 136-140.

[241] Hansen, 2006: 122.

between August 30 and September 21, [1995]."[242]

Between the early days of the Clinton administration and the revved up bombing of Serbian and Bosnian Serb targets in late 1995, the administration considered a number of possible options. First, according to a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) memorandum dated February 1993, CIA tiered three response option levels: (1) minimal activism, including a no-fly zone, sanctions against Serbia, the public condemnation of atrocities, and undermining the Serbian and Bosnian Serb governments; (2) moderate activism, which provided enhance aid to Bosnia, create demilitarized Bosnia, and lift the small arms embargo against Bosnia; and (3) militant activism, which required the deepest level of engagement aimed at seeking a direct settlement to the various Balkan conflicts (including the Croatian war, the Bosnian war, and the issue of Greater Serbia) backed up by the use of force.[243] Actions classified as minimal activism marked the first few years of US response to the Bosnian war. In the fall of 1994 and throughout 1995 the administration was *still* debating whether to lift the Bosnian arms embargo.[244]

Even as the atrocities committed by Serbs and Bosnian Serbs continued to escalate, the humanitarian situation become more complex, and conflict spillover was becoming of greater concern there were still dire warnings issued of the consequences of more militant activism. An embassy cable from Sarajevo warns, for instance, that if the US was to commit to greater military engagement "it means being prepared for bodies, a long term commitment, resources,

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[242] Ibid.

[243] "Principals Meeting on 'Yugoslavia' and 'Yugoslavia Policy Options: Likely Responses,'" *Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Interagency Balkan Taskforce*, February 1, 1993.

[244] Anthony Lake, "Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy," *The White House*, September 14, 1993; "An Evaluation of the Washington Post Article 'Would Lifting Embargo Help Bosnia?'" *Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Interagency Balkan Taskforce*, August 3, 1995.

"money," and a willingness to escalate.[245] Amidst of lack of resolute action on the part of the United States, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia carried on. By July 1995, it was clear that "None of the warring parties in the Bosnian conflict is likely to accept a negotiated settlement in the foreseeable future under current conditions [and that] fighting is likely to increase throughout the summer and the conflict in Croatia is likely to flare-up by the fall."[246] The DCI provided four alternative policy courses: (1) direct intervention, whereby it was foreseen that "the intervention force would suffer casualties and unless Serbia were deterred from involvement in the conflict, a long-term foreign military commitment would be required to keep peace in the region"; (2) muddling through, which was meant to contain fighting rather than achieve a stable resolution to the conflict; (3) tilting towards Bosnian Serbs in negotiations, seemingly a nonstarter given the assessment that "the Bosnian government would abandon the negotiating track altogether"; and (4) a simultaneous withdrawal of UN troops from Bosnia and a lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia, essentially qualifying as international disengagement.[247]

Muddle through was seemingly the course of action that the Clinton administration was engaged in through the first few years of the Bosnia conflict, exemplified by a statement by then-UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright: "With a stronger Bosnian-army unwilling to wait for peace at the negotiating table, and in the aftermath of Srebrenica and Zepa, the Bosnian side and international opinion will simply not allow us to return to the relative success of 1994. Muddle

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[245] "I've Broken the Machine," *U.S. State Department Cable*, May 27, 1993.

[246] "Bosnia: Alternative Courses of Action," *Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Interagency Balkan Taskforce*, July 13, 1995.

[247] Ibid.

through is no longer an option."[248] As aforementioned, two weeks after Srebrenica, NATO authorized military planning with the objective deterring anticipated future attacks against other "safe areas," and on August 30, 1995 NATO announced that airstrikes against Serbian and Bosnian Serb targets would begin. The intensification of NATO's engagement in Bosnia, via its new bombing campaign and the attack on the forward positions of the Bosnian Serb armed forces, pressured Slobodan Milosevic's government to more seriously engage in diplomatic efforts aimed at finding a political solution to the war, leading to the Dayton agreement, which was signed on December 14, 1995.

Albright gives a few reasons for why she considered it appropriate for the US to begin taking stronger stand in Bosnia by mid-1995: (1) "In much the same way that our failure to solve the Haiti problem last year threatened to overshadow all of our other accomplishments, I fear Bosnia will overshadow our entire first term;" and (2) "…Our continued reluctance to lead an effort to resolve a military crisis in the heart of Europe has placed at risk our leadership of the post Cold War world."[249] The second justification is particularly interesting in that it alludes to the preservation of the United States' status in a "post-Cold War world"—a less optimistic world than that described in President Bush's "new world order," but one in which US leadership could still be counted on to lead to stabilizing outcomes. At the same time, the Clinton administration's now long-time intransigence on humanitarian intervention was easing as the US replaced its own internal justificatory discourse related to the merits of neutrality and of non-intervention with a discourse of collective guilt over inaction in Rwanda and Srebrenica. This guilt resulting from US inaction in both aforementioned cases helped overcome the United States' trauma of the

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[248] Madeleine Albright, "Memorandum to the National Security Advisor," August 3, 1995.

[249] Albright, 1995.

Somalia experience when engaging in reflection regarding whether to engage in interventionist practice. These two genocides, and the success of NATO airstrikes in bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiating table at Dayton and in Paris allowed the US to learn from these new experiences in a way that expanded its performance possibility range related to humanitarian intervention. Intervention once again became possible because doing nothing became unconscionable and because the success of a certain type of intervention—from afar, via airstrikes, with no troops on the ground until a political settlement was reached—showed that not all interventionist tactics were equal.

The United States' relatively swift and resolute response to the crisis in Kosovo in 1999 and the failure of the Rambouillet talks to produce a political outcome, to emulate its actions in Bosnia in 1995 by conducting high altitude airstrikes with NATO partners, is a testament to the degree to which the Bosnia experience served as a learning tool for the administration. NATO's objectives in Kosovo were to precipitate:

> "(1) A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression; (2) the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces; (3) the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; (4) the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations (sic); and (5) the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations."[250]

Although few in the Clinton administration were bursting with enthusiasm for intervention in Kosovo, watching genocide unfold was once again no longer a comfortable position for the US precisely because it had previously experienced that position.

The US navigated a complex and tense set of interactions along various interaction nodes.

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[250] "NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),* July 15, 1999.

NATO's political resolve to engage in action in Kosovo was not absolute or without reservation. Military commanders had differing benchmarks for progress and did not present a uniform strategic front. The Russian government threatened to intervene on behalf of Serbia.[251] And the UN Security Council failed to deliver authorization for the use of military force because of Russian and Chinese opposition ("uninvolved with the [Kosovo] Contact Group and less concerned than Russia about the problems of instability or Western influence in the Balkans, China's initial priority was to resist UN involvement in what it dubbed a domestic dispute"[252]).

Although the United States' performance possibility range regarding humanitarian efforts had once again began to expand after the Srebrenica genocide, it took on a fundamentally different character than it had when the Bush administration decided to participate in multilateral humanitarian operations in Somalia. Although intervention was once again on the table as a viable policy, this engagement still policed through the lens of PDD-25. But instead of looking for ways to frame intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo as beyond US interests, the administration began to frame them as consistent with PDD-25's articulated policy on multilateral peacekeeping operations. In Kosovo, NATO eventually geared up its bombings to such a degree that they constituted the sort of overwhelming force considered necessary through PDD-25's guidelines.[253] Furthermore, the conduct of "proper" intervention shifted away from deep engagement with large numbers of ground troops to a more shallow engagement—in the case of

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[251] James M. Goldgeier, "Review: Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo by John Norris," *Political Science Quarterly* 121, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 180.

[252] Bates Gill, and James Reilly, "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing," *Survival* 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 47.

[253] Ivo H. Daalder, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo," *Foreign Policy* 116 (Autumn 1999): 128-140.

both Bosnia and Kosovo, from an altitude of 30,000 feet. Boots on the ground were out of the question until the warring parties agreed upon a real political solution and the situation on the ground was stable enough to not bring potential injury to US personnel.

The expansion of imagined policy possibilities with respect to Bosnia and Kosovo were largely contingent on the US' failure of the international community to respond to genocide in Rwanda. Counterfactually, we might imagine that a botched US or Western intervention in Rwanda might have calcified post-Somalia anti-interventionism in Africa and its discursive justifications, and might have projected its policy prescription of diplomatic avoidance onto the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Rather than moving in the direction of a detached interventionism, the US and its allies might have become even more convinced of the need to stay out of complicated civil conflicts that appeared to outsiders to be the result of decades—or centuries—of inter-group animosity and ethno-political manipulation by generations of leaders. Alternatively, had the US or international community intervened with troops on the ground in Rwanda, with few or no casualties to the intervening force, had the genocide been stopped or curbed by such intervention, and had the discursive response to such intervention from the public been positive, we can imagine that the US' imagined policy possibilities might have expanded to include a ground intervention in Kosovo.

Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect

The Kosovo intervention was controversial on account of the fact that the US and NATO did not seek antecedent authorization from the UN Security Council, calling into question the legality of the use of force. In this context of controversy, on authority of the Canadian government, composed of an international group of scholars and experts, and relying on perspective gathering from members of the UN General Assembly, the ICISS sought to

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formulate an international policy on humanitarian intervention that could gain widespread

international support. The motivations for the founding of ICISS are worth reproducing here in

full, as it underscores what the international community learned during imperfect (to say the

least) responses to humanitarian crises in the 1990s:

> "External military intervention for human protection purposes has been controversial
> both when it has happened – as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo – and when it has failed
> to happen, as in Rwanda. For some the new activism has been a long overdue
> internationalization of the human conscience; for others it has been an alarming breach of
> an international state order dependent on the sovereignty of states and the inviolability of
> their territory. For some, again, the only real issue is ensuring that coercive interventions
> are effective; for others, questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of
> precedent loom much larger. NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 brought the
> controversy to its most intense head. Security Council members were divided; the legal
> justification for military action without new Security Council authority was asserted but
> largely unargued (sic); the moral or humanitarian justification for the action, which on the
> face of it was much stronger, was clouded by allegations that the intervention generated
> more carnage than it averted; and there were many criticisms of the way in which the
> NATO allies conducted the operation."[254]

This normative "middle ground"—in the sense that R2P represents a compromise between

interventionists who thought the world did not do enough in Rwanda and Bosnia, and non-

interventionists who decried NATO's bombing campaign over Kosovo illegal—was justified as

congruent with existing practice and justification clusters related to the protection of human

rights, that mass atrocities and genocide constitute a threat to international peace and security

even if they occur solely within an individual state's borders, and just war principles. The 2001

ICISS report also attempted to create new imaginative space by clearly reformulating the

meaning of sovereignty from an absolute and inviolable right that accompanies statehood to a

privilege that states have to earn by guaranteeing their citizens protection from genocide and

ethnic cleansing.

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[254] Gareth Evans, et al., 2001: VII.

Conclusion: Comparing Process, Comparing Outcomes

As chronicled above, US intervention policy shifted dramatically during the 1990s. The mistakes of the US' military participation in UN operations in Somalia caused the US government (and its constituents) to reassess its earlier optimism about the validity and appropriateness of armed intervention for humanitarian purposes and to replace that optimism with a deep skepticism regarding the merits and possible success of such interventions. The less than subtle parallels of race and "barbarism" between Somalia and Rwanda allowed the Clinton administration to maintain an intransigent anti-intervention position even as Rwandans were being slaughtered in front of Western camera crews. I concentrate substantial effort on the decision regarding a US response to the Rwandan genocide, and the immediate aftermath thereof, because this case serves as an important focal point during which competing normative practices and discursive justifications produced a significant degree of uncertainty in US policy regarding appropriate intervention practices.

The Clinton administration's response to the overlapping crisis in Bosnia was also first overshadowed by the Somali experience. Although the language of ancient hatreds regarding Bosnia was less racialized, as with respects to Rwanda, the administration's calculus was similar. The shock of the backlash against the Somalia intervention made future interventions untenable until such a time that another shock might cause leaders to reimagine possible policies. The post-facto analysis of the scale of the atrocities in Rwanda served as that shock, leading the Clinton administration to fundamentally recalculate its stance against intervention for the second time in a matter of a few years. Appropriate conduct in the face of mass atrocities shifted from inaction to detached intervention made possible by technologically advanced military tactics.

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In another time and another place the specific directions in which intervention policy might have gone is difficult to predict. The historical narrative presented here does not shed light on that. Instead, as I will discuss in greater detail in the following chapter, through the coupling of the historical narrative with the ideal-type from chapter 3 we can arrive a number of important conclusions about how normative practices generally evolve as well as the reasons that certain environmental shocks contributed to shifting normative practices in the specific context discussed in the present chapter. The concluding chapter argues that coupling the narrative and the ideal-type is analytically useful for researchers who want to understand the mechanisms that led to a complex evolution of US intervention practices in the 1990s.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

<u>Causal Factors for US Intervention Policy Shifts in the 1990s</u>

As seen above, the Bush administration's decision to intervene in Somalia was the result of normative and discursive shifts that expanded the United States' performance possibility range and made multilateral humanitarian intervention an option that was consistent with other normative clusters. The Clinton administration's perspective regarding intervention after the battle of Mogadishu changed dramatically, accounting for the United States' unwaveringly anti-interventionist position in Rwanda. The outrage at the slaughter in Rwanda allowed the for the development of new discourses back in the direction of supporting intervention efforts. Ground intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, however, was no longer an option, and the Clinton administration avoided putting US boots on the ground. Finally, after NATO's bombings in Bosnia and Kosovo, rhetoric shifted towards a practical middle ground.

It is important to clarify that by highlighting a movement to middle ground, as I argue is the case with the emergence of R2P, I run the risk of implying that the model articulated in chapter 3 inherently prefers the moderate solution after successive pendulum swings from one extreme to another. Although with the emergence of R2P, we do see this phenomenon, the model does not itself predict this outcome. Instead, we see in several sections of chapter 4 I articulate possible alternative realities if circumstance and context had been slightly different. The brief counterfactual exercises in chapter 4 help us appreciate the analytical utility of this model.

An ideal-typified model alone cannot explain any complex social phenomenon. The narrative alone is no more than a historical recollection without a model through which to make sense of the causal factors leading to particular outcomes—it, without structure or order, simply

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has too many potential data points that could function as causal factors. Thus, the union of the model with the narrative allows for complementarity. The model provides a general vision of causal factors internal to processes of normative systems evolution and the narrative provides additional causal factors that are unique to that context. General and case-specific causal factors come together to produce the outcomes analysts perceive.

The overlaying of the historical narrative of chapter 4 onto my complex normative systems evolution ideal-type allows analysts to identify adequate, coincidental, and incidental factors that relate to this research. Adequate causal factors refer to those which are "part of an ideal-typically specified causal configuration without which we cannot imagine the outcome having occurred"; coincidentally causal factors are those without which "we cannot imagine the outcome having occurred… but that [are not] part of a systematic ideal-type"; incidental factors refer to non-causal factors whose presence or lack thereof does not affect whether we imagine the outcome being possible.[255]

The adequate causal factors in the context of this research are (1) the presence of an environmental stimulus caused by the interaction of a multiplicity of actors, which appears to be exogenous to the actor whose normative perspective we are analyzing and which shifts, constricts, or expands an actors performance possibility range; and (2) a moment of critical self-reflection by the actor we are analyzing who must generate a justificatory discourse for its actions that makes sense of the aforementioned environmental stimuli. We see through the historical narrative presented in the previous chapter that at each instance preceding changes in intervention practices by the US, the US government was exposed to an external event that changed its performance possibility range, it engaged in critical self-reflection (albeit sometimes

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[255] Jackson, 2010: 150.

slowly), and it was reformulated the practice justification clusters through which it engaged with other actors to make sense of the new situations.

Coincidental causal factors in the context of this research include: (1) the end of Cold War rivalries; and (2) the location and geopolitical linkages between the US and each site of potential intervention. More broadly, factors such as public opinion, electoral cycles, domestic political circumstances (i.e. the strength of support or opposition in Congress and among military leaders), the framing of intervention-related issues by policy analysts, journalists, and activists, etc. constituted coincidental factors insofar as US administrations used them to reach conclusions during the reflective moments that are internal to my model.

First, the end of Cold War rivalries made multilateralism possible in the 1990s. Whereas actors could not pursue multilateral intervention in places where the Soviet Union and the US were fighting proxy wars, the new unipolar international environment allowed actors to form pragmatic alliances regarding courses of action in the same low-middle power and weak states that were previous proxy war fighting grounds. Russia's rhetoric shifted away from frequent, unreflective opposition to nearly anything for which the US advocated. Post-Soviet Russia had a moment of self-searching and identity defining that caused it to give the US more leeway in pursuing some multilateral foreign policy objectives such as the Gulf War and participating in UNITAF. Had Cold War rivalries persisted, we might imagine that instead of Somalia falling into a state of governance anarchy after the assassination of Barre, the US and the Soviets/Russians would have each supported opposing factions, leading to a relatively symmetrical and regulated proxy war. We might also imagine that there might not have been a UNITAF because one of the two superpowers (perhaps both) would have vetoed UN

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peacekeeping action beyond first generation peacekeeping.[256] The shifting US attitudes towards multilateral intervention was made possible by discussions regarding the role of the US in a unipolar, US-"won," post-Cold War world.

Second, the location and geopolitical linkages between the US and potential sites of intervention had causal effects on the narrative. If, for instance, Somalia or Rwanda would have been in Europe, or had a stronger geopolitical linkage to the US, we could imagine the US response being very different. Similarly, if Srebrenica and Kosovo had not unfolded under the watchful eye of the European Community and NATO, we might imagine that the US might have treated Bosnia and Kosovo with the same apathy Rwanda received. Although explicit rivalries among great powers declined significantly with the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical linkage between Serbia and Russia might have actually convinced the Clinton administration that there was more to lose in Bosnia if the Bosnian Serbs were militarily victorious.

If we take seriously the claim that what separates neopositivists' variables from analyticists' factors is that whereas the former are treated as causally competing, the latter are treated as *coming together* in context specific arrangements to produce particular outcomes, we are right to question whether there is such a thing as a non-causal factor. Since we could imagine how every detail of every factor might have caused another detail in another factor to change, going all the way up to the factors we can identify as coincidental,[257] we are left with a complex causal system of a few adequate factors and an infinite number of coincidental factors.

Such a conclusion, although tempting, leaves us analytically bankrupt—not able to

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[256] Michael W. Doyle, and Rosalyn Higgins, "Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law," *Structures of World Order* 89 (1995): 275-279.

[257] See Stephen H. Kellert, *In the Wake of Chaos: Unpredictable Order in Dynamical Systems*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

meaningfully distinguish between a verbal exchange in the White House situation room and the flapping of the butterfly's wings (or, more abstractly, between proximal causal factors and initial conditions).[258] The reason we can say that non-causal factor exist is that we are not looking far back enough to see all initial conditions, thereby being able to distinguish between conditions that form a "pre-existing" foundation, and newly arising ones beginning at the start of the period of analysis. This makes it possible to consider factors that, during the period of analysis, have remained relatively constant, thereby not influencing the variation among the decisions taken during that period.

Several factors that did not change during the period of analysis include, for example: (1) the United States' material capability to actually carry out interventionary military action; and (2) the United States' economic growth throughout the 1990s. Although if the US lacked the capacity to engage in interventionary action and had not experienced a simultaneous period of relatively stable economic growth, we might expect intervention not to have happened at all, the fact that during a period of relative consistent military and economic power, the US engaged in intervention at some points, refused to at others, and then changed what it considered proper conduct during intervention leads to the conclusion that these factors have weak causal power. Other incidental factors are those events, facts, framings, and representations that the US administrations did not consider when reflecting on past practices of intervention. Most importantly, actors' choices regarding who among their peers (or subjects) to listen to, who to negotiate with, and whose perspective to include in briefings, reports, discussions, debates, and speeches, impacted the path of decision-making.

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[258] See Edward M. Lorenz, "Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil set off a Tornado in Texas?" *Presented at the 139th Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1972.

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My choice to apply the ideal-type I create in chapter 3 to a discussion on the evolution of US policy regarding humanitarian intervention in the 1990s is not accidental. I chose this topic because I find that it constitutes an interesting puzzle. During just one decade the United States' policy regarding humanitarian intervention shifted dramatically in a number of directions. First, the US saw intervention as a potential contribution to global security and to the enforcement of a new world order of multilateralism that left behind the dangers of the Cold War world. Then, after Somalia, the US recoiled as public opinion turned against intervention that included significant engagement of US ground troops, particularly under the command of foreign military personnel and international organizations. Then, again after inaction during the Rwandan genocide and as the situation in Bosnia further deteriorated, the US reassessed its commitment to nonintervention settling on a policy that aerial intervention could be justified during a humanitarian disaster but that boots on the ground would only come after a political solution was agreed to and implemented.

These shifts do not represent a random and incoherent set of policies undertaken by an inexperienced US President. Instead, they represent the way in which international actors imagine the practices they undertake, the ways in which they justify them, and how they make sense of their surroundings, which (on account of being produced by constant interaction among over 6 billion individuals, nearly 200 states, local governments, businesses and corporations, NGOs, international organizations, interest groups, etc.) can be relative exogenous, dangerous, and unpredictable.

The ideal-type I articulate is not meant to fit only my narrative in chapter 4. Quite the opposite, it is intended that it be overlaid onto other phenomena related to normative change. For

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instance, how did Soviet leadership in the 1980s reinterpret practice and justification cluster linkages as well as their performance possibility ranges given new environmental conditions (for instance, economic decline and the high cost of continuing building up nuclear arms)? More abstractly, might this model be overlaid onto empirical data regarding actors' arrival at specific cost-benefit analyses, perhaps shedding insight into how actors build meaning around certain material or non-material interests? The applicability of the ideal-type I articulate herein is therefore, perhaps ironically given the importance of imagination to my model's description of practice possibility ranges, limited only by the degree to which actors posses the imagination to envision its usefulness across diverse sets of empirical puzzles.

> *"Knowledge falters when imagination clips its wings or fears to use them. Every great advance in science has issued from a new audacity of imagination."*[259]

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[259] John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (Gifford Lectures 1929),* Kessinger Publishing, 2005.

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